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INTRODUCTION

In April 2019, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Commissioner
Scott Gottlieb decreed interchangeable insulin poised for market entry within
the next few years.' If this projection holds true, this would make insulin the first
biologic to achieve interchangeable biologic status. 2 Insulin, relatively "simpler"

than more complex biologics and with a substantial amount of real-world evidence supporting its safety and efficacy, is a natural choice for interchangeable
biologic status. 3 The Association for Accessible Medicines (AAM) notes that
brand-to-brand switches of insulin products regularly occur at the direction of
providers, and "the risk of diminished safety or efficacy from a transition is minimal or not present" due to the nature of insulin products. 4 Interchangeable status
for insulin promises a tremendous impact on costs because it will allow insulin
to be dispensed at retail pharmacies, subject to state interchangeable biologic
substitution laws. 5
The FDA has regulated insulin since it was first used to treat diabetes almost
one hundred years ago. 6 Insulin, which maintains the conversion of glucose to
energy in those with diabetes, is life-saving and expensive. 7 Insulin products
have historically been subject to FDA regulation as a drug, which mandates

Zachary Brennan, Updated: Interchangeable Biosimilars: FDA Finalizes Guidance,
REG. AFFS. PROF. Soc'Y: REG. Focus (May 13, 2019), https://www.raps.org/news-and-arti-

cles/news-articles/2019/5/i nterchangeable-biosimilars-fda-fmalizes-guidance
[https://perma.cc/8QM7-UDX7].
2 Id.
3 See Ass'n for Accessible Med. Biosimilars Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule:
The Future of Insulin Biosimilars: Increasing Access and Facilitating the Efficient Development of Biosimilar and Interchangeable Insulin Products 4 (May 31, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=FDA-2019-N-l l320326&attachmentNumberl=&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/96A7-G6WC].

4 Id. at 5.
5 See id.
6

Insulin products are often marketed as combination products, consisting of both the in-

sulin and the delivery device. See 21 C.F.R. § 3.2(e)(1) (2019); see also FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT COMBINATION PRODUCTS (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/combination-products/about-combination-products/frequently-askedquestions-about-combination-products#examples [https://perma.cc/5LLL-GDLM].

See Tiffany Stanley, Life, Death, and Insulin, THE WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/07/feature/insulin-is-a-lifesaving-drug-but-it-has-become-intolerably-expensive-and-the-consequences-can-be-tragic
[https://perma.cc/J3T7-VXEF].
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rigorous clinical trials. 8 Due to incremental innovation in the technology re9
quired, no insulin product has entered the market as a generic drug. Also, given
the natural characteristics of insulin and its batch-to-batch variability, satisfying
the statutory and regulatory "bioequivalence" threshold for traditional generic
drug approval is difficult, leading to the use of the new drug approval pathway
to market. 10 The persistently high cost of insulin restricts universal access,
1
causes some patients to dangerously ration their supply, and fuels the broad
interest of "do-it-yourself' groups who develop their own unapproved versions.' 2 State responses to skyrocketing insulin costs include legislation that puts
3
a cap on monthly insulin prices.'

In March 2020, the FDA began regulatory transition of insulin products originally approved as "new drugs" to "biological products" subject to Public Health
4
Service Act (PHSA) requirements.' In accordance with PHSA amendments fur-

nished by the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2010 (BPCIA),
this regulatory shift gives insulin status as a "reference product" in determining
whether other biological products meet the unique evidentiary threshold for ei5
ther a "biosimilar" or "interchangeable" classification.' Significantly, a biologic product's "interchangeability" implies that a FDA-approved product may
be substituted for insulin without prescriber involvement under state law.16
Nearly every state has interchangeable biologic substitution laws in place, which

8

See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DEVELOPMENT & APPROVAL PROCESS: DRUGS (Oct. 28,

2019),

https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs

[https://perma.cc/376K-SGKV].
9

Lutz Heinemann, BiosimilarInsulin and Costs: What Can We Expect?, 10 J. DIABETES

SCi. & TECH, 457, 458 (2016).
" See David R. Owens et al., The Emergence ofBiosimilarInsulin Preparations-ACause
for Concern?, 14 DIABETES TECH. & THERAPEUTICS, no. 1 1, at 989,989-990, 993-94 (2012).
" See Stanley, supra note 7.
2 Jenna E. Gallegos & Jean Peccoud, After a Century, Insulin is Still Expensive- Could
DIYers Change That?, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 13, 2018, 10:32 AM EDT), https://thecon-

versation.com/after-a-century-insulin-is-still-expensive-could-diyers-change-that-99822
[https://perma.cc/FUZ3-5J9K].
" Colorado and Illinois both cap the monthly cost of insulin at one hundred dollars. 2019
Colo. Sess. Laws 2418; Pub. Act 101-0625, 2019 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 667
(LexisNexis).
" FDA Works to Ensure Smooth Regulatory Transition of Insulin and Other Biological
Products, FDA (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-

works-ensure-smooth-regulatory-transition-insulin-and-other-biological-products
[https://perma.cc/8UHM-EQ9Q].
" See Public Health Service Act of 1944 §§ 262(i)(1-2), 42 U.S.C. § 262(i); Owens et al.,
supra note 10 at 994. These classifications are explored in Part Ih.A.
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3).
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differ from generic drug substitution laws. 7 This article explores the implications of this current variation in state legislation for patients, prescribers, and
pharmacists.
The article proceeds in five parts. Utilizing a hypothetical scenario, Part I
identifies five concrete problems arising out of the current regulatory and legal
landscape pertaining to biologic products. The article then explains the foundational structures, laws, regulations, and common law that give rise to these problems. Part II explores the insulin market, focusing particularly on cost considerations and characteristics of insulin that make it the likely candidate to achieve
the title of first interchangeable biologic product. This part also assesses the difference between drug and biologic approval and explains the importance of the
March 2020 regulatory transition (or "switch") of insulin products from drug
status to biologic status. Part III analyzes and compares two types of state laws

impacting the insulin marketplace: interchangeable substitution laws and insulin
price caps. State provisions under assessment regarding interchangeable substitution include requirements for physician notations on scripts, physician notification procedures upon pharmacist substitution, and patient product notification
requirements. Recent insulin price cap laws are also assessed as an accelerating
trend and a direct lever on costs.
Turning to state common law, Part IV examines the potential impact of state

law on tort liability based on federal preemption case law across the FDAapproved product spectrum. While the Supreme Court has addressed drug and
device preemption, it has not addressed biologic preemption, except in the limited context of vaccines. 18 Addressing the inconsistencies between state interchangeable biologic substitution laws and state tort liability case law pertaining
to biologics is imperative to protect patients. Part V sets forth several recommendations to address the problems stemming from state law and federal
preemption jurisprudence from a patient safety and public health perspective.
I. FORECASTING PUBLIC HARMS IN THE INTERCHANGEABLE INSULIN REALM

Consider the following hypothetical in the context of a future interchangeable
insulin market:
A patient with Type 1 Diabetes consults their physician, complaining about a
side effect of their current short-acting insulin product. The physician determines that the proper course of action is to switch the patient to a recently-ap-

proved rapid-acting insulin product. The physician writes a script for the rapid-

7

Forty-five states and Puerto Rico have interchangeable biologic substitution laws. Sarah

Beth S. Kuyers, MFNTz, Forty-Five States Now Have BiosimilarSubstitution Laws, 9 NAT'L
L. REV., no. 42, 2019, at 1, 1-2, https://www.natlawreview.com/article/45-states-now-have-

biosimilar-substitution-laws [https://perma.cc/6XGA-DXEL].
" See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 562 U.S. 223, 223-243 (2011) (regarding awards paid out of
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act's compensation fund as preemptive to all other design-defect claims against vaccine manufacturers).
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acting insulin product and hands it to the patient, who then travels to a pharmacy
to fill the prescription. What the patient may not realize, nor the physician, is
that depending on the state, there may be significant differences in outcomes
because of legislation setting forth varying procedures for the substitution of
interchangeable biologic products. Recent laws establishing price caps for insulin will also introduce variability by state. This patient description is purely
hypothetical, for the reasons identified below, although the general scenario will
inevitably play out in the future. The potential harms to patients arising from
such a scenario is significant, and raises five core problems that the current regulatory and legal system have yet to address. Each problem is explored below.
A. Biological ProductsAre Not Generics

Biological products will never have "generic" versions due to their characteristics and the statutory framework overseeing their market entry. Biological
products are never "the same" as the innovator product.1 9 On the other hand,
because chemically synthesized drugs can be engineered to closely mimic the
innovator drug, the state generic substitution laws are triggered with market entry of any generic drug product, without intervention from the Food & Drug
20
Administration (FDA) as to that substitution decision. Generic drug substitu-

tion laws have been in play for decades following enactment of Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (also known as the Hatch-Wax-

man Act). All drugs approved by the FDA through the new drug approval
process are eligible to serve as reference products for generic versions if the
FDA deems the two products to be bioequivalent, which for all practical pur2
poses means nearly identical. 1
Though generic drug substitution laws vary state-by-state, they often share
commonalities in the context of interchangeable biologic laws, as many states
used preexisting regulatory schemes to guide drafting of their own interchangeable biologics legislation. 22 The generic drug substitution laws either mandate
or permit pharmacists to dispense the generic drug when a physician prescribes
the reference brand drug, except if explicitly directed otherwise by the physician.23 When the physician or other prescribing entity indicates on the script that
the drug is not to be substituted-typically with "may not substitute," "dispense

19 See Owens et al., supra note 10, at 990.
20 See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need
a Re-Designed Approachfor the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y L. & ETHICS, 293,
311-14 (2015) (chronicling evolution of state generic substitution laws and interface with

FDA).
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 USC § 505(j).
22 See id. at 312.
21

23

Id
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as written," or similar language-the pharmacist may not dispense a generic. 24

If no 'brand-only' notation is indicated by the prescriber, thirty-six states have
laws allowing generic substitution, while the remaining fourteen mandate generic substitution. 25 Some states, such as New Jersey, have "positive formulary"
laws, whereby generics that may be substituted are identified in a formulary;
other states, such as Minnesota, have "negative formulary" laws, whereby drugs

that cannot be substituted are identified in the formulary. 26 Many laws also require patient notification or consent to the substitution, or that the drug dispensed
by the pharmacist is less or equal price to the prescribed drug. 27
A more comprehensive exploration of state generic drug substitution laws is
unnecessary. The reality is that generic drug substitution laws are more uniform
in nature; states fall into broad categories with predictable outcomes depending
on the provisions. They are well-established laws, patients and prescribers are
aware of their scope and function, and insurance providers have developed practices over decades to establish coverage and reimbursement actions. 28 Perhaps
most importantly, chemical compounds regulated as drugs are nearly identical,
save for miniscule variations allowable within the FDA's bounds of "bioequivalence." When adverse events or harmful products do surface, there are
longstanding regulatory mechanisms to swiftly address them. There is also Supreme Court case law dealing with state tort law applicability, as discussed in
Part IV.
Biologics are by their very nature not identical, with the potential for significant variation given their biological rather than chemically derived source, their
size, and their structural complexity. The scientific community, the FDA, and
Congress all recognize that two biologic products cannot be identical or "same"
products. Rather, Congress has set forth the comparison as one measuring
whether they are "highly similar" instead, leaving much of the evidentiary requirement setting to the FDA. 29 This is evidenced by the requirement that a bi-

ological product be "highly similar" to the reference innovator product to
achieve "biosimilar status," an evidentiary standard not required of generic
24 See State Laws or Statutes Governing Generic Substitution by Pharmacists(illustra-

tion), Epilepsy.com (Apr. 25 2007), http://professionals.epilepsy.com/page/statutesbypharmacists.html, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFF. ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR
PLAN. & EVALUATION, ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 7 app. a

(2010).
See id
26 Jesse C. Vivian, Generic-Substitution Laws, U.S. PHARM., Sept. 2008, at 30,
32-33
25

(2008).
27 See Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 21, at 312.
28 See, e.g., Vivian supra note 26.

See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need
a Re-Designed Approachfor the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS, 293,
311-14 (2015) (chronicling evolution of state generic substitution laws and interface with
29

FDA).
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drugs.30 Moreover, "interchangeable" status does not require "bioequivalence,"
but rather "biosimilar" status, such that the product "can be expected to produce
the same clinical result as the reference product in any given patient" and, additionally, "may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention
31
of the health care provider who prescribed the reference product." Thus, the
heightened status of interchangeability requires that the product is both biosimilar and that the FDA has determined that product can be automatically substi32

tuted at the pharmacy.
As noted earlier, once the FDA approves an interchangeable product, it is up

to individual states to determine as a matter of state law whether an interchangeable product may be substituted for a reference biologic and what requirements
are associated with that substitution, leading to the 45 statutes discussed in Part
III. The inconsistency in the state interchangeable substitution laws, and the uncertainty in the case law on state tort law causes of action against manufacturers,
make for a potentially frustrating future for patients receiving interchangeable
33
biologics.
B. Lack ofPatientand PrescriberAwareness
Most American consumers are unaware of the regulatory differences between
drugs and biologics. Both types of products are therapeutics that are prescribed
or administrated by physicians or other medical specialists, with uniform formatting in their labels and promotional materials as regulated by the FDA. How-

ever, whether a product enters the market through the new drug approval process, the generic drug approval process, or through mechanisms for biological
products, has profound implications for the abbreviated routes to market availa-

ble, state substitution laws, and federal preemption of state tort law for manufacturer liability. Likewise, public understanding of the recently added biosimilar and interchangeable pathways to market for biologic products is practically

nonexistent. 34 Unfortunately, there is accumulating evidence that prescribers
35
also do not have a firm grasp on regulatory aspects and their implications. The
FDA implementation contributes to this lack of awareness, as without standardized procedures for both pre-market and post-market evaluations of biosimilar
products, there is bound to be confusion among pharmacists, physicians, pa36
tients, and healthcare providers.
30 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2).
@262(i)(3); § 262(k)(4)(A)(ii).
3§
32 See id.
See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
IV C.
3 See Sean McGowan, Five Years On, Biosimilars Need Support From All Healthcare
Players, STAT NEWS (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/06/biosimilars-inus-turn-five/ [https://perma.cc/Q286-FFDP].
3

34 See infra Section

36

See discussion infra p. 20.
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Recently, the FDA and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) targeted some aspects of labeling and advertising to address consumer perceptions and awareness. In February 2020, the two agencies issued a joint statement announcing

efforts to support competition and deter anti-competitive behaviors in the biologic arena. 37 These measures include: (1) policing false and misleading statements comparing innovator biologics to biosimilar versions; (2) facilitating public outreach and coordination with industry, academic, and government agencies
to address industry behaviors that stifle competition and obscure information;
and (3) publishing draft guidance on promotional activities and labeling to en-

sure clear comprehension of the product characteristics. 38 These measures respond to calls from industry and consumer groups to address misinformation in
the biosimilar market. 39 In addition, the FTC intends to review patent settlement
agreements between reference product and biosimilar manufacturers to ensure
that they are void of anticompetitive reverse payments that slow or defeat the
introduction of lower-priced medicines, including biosimilars 4 0 The FDA also
intends to develop educational materials to inform the public and healthcare professionals about trusted safety and efficacy of FDA-approved biosimilars.4 1 The
FTC and FDA held a joint workshop to educate stakeholders about U.S. biosimilar markets and FDA approval process, enforcement activities by the FDA and
FTC, the benefits of competition, and improving stakeholder engagement.42

37 FDA andFTCAnnounce New Efforts to FurtherDeter Anti-Competitive Business Practices, Support Competitive Marketfor BiologicalProductsto Help Americans, FDA (Feb. 3,
2020), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-and-ftc-announce-newefforts-further-deter-anti-competitive-business-practices-support
[https://perma.cc/VJ5L-

3U7R].
38 Id; see FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE, PROMOTIONAL LABELING AND ADVERTISING
CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRESCRIPTION BIOLOGICAL REFERENCE AND BIOSIMTLAR PRODUCTS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY (Feb. 2020), https://www.fda.gov/me-

dia/134862/download [https://perma.cc/46Q4-ILMS].
3

See Zachary Brennan, BiosimilarForum Callsfor FDA Guidance to Address Misinfor-

mation, REG. AFFS. PRO. SOC'Y: REG. FOCUs (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.raps.org/news-andarticles/news-articles/2018/12/biosimilars-forum-calls-for-fda-guidance-to-addres
[https://perma.cc/YG5U-WRPF]; see also Zachary Brennan, Industry Groups Call on FDA
to Dispel Biosimilar Misinformation, REG. AFFS. PRO. Soc'Y: REG. Focus (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2019/2/industry-groups-call-on-fda-

to-dispel-biosimilar-m [https://perma.cc/6LWT-KUP2].
&

40 STEPHEN M. HAHN, FDA & JOSEPH J. SIMONS, FTC, JOINT STATEMENT OF THE FOOD
ADMINISTRATION
AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
REGARDING
A
COLLABORATION TO ADVANCE COMPETITION [N THE BIOLOGIC MARKETPLACE 6 (Feb. 3, 2020)
DRUG

https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/publicstatements/1565273/v 190003fdaftcbio-

logicsstatement.pdf [https://perma.cc/DP8A-N45R].
41 Id. at 5.
42 Public Workshop: FDA/FTC Workshop on a Competitive Marketplacefor Biosimilars,
FDA (March 9, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/news-events-human-drugs/public-
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C. Anticompetitive Business as Usual

In addition to concerns specific to biologics discussed above, the biologic industry also engages in typical monopolistic behaviors prevalent in the pharmaceutical realm. The pharmaceutical industry has long-been criticized for its use
of anticompetitive tactics that effectively increase profits and stifle competition. 43 These tactics include shifting demand to a modified form of an existing
brand drug (often called "product hopping") where the modified product has a
longer patent life,44 allowing authorized generics of innovator products through

45
agreements with other manufacturers to retain market share, frivolously filing
46
citizens petitions to the FDA in order to delay generic market entry, and entering into reverse payment settlements to keep generic drugs off the market during
their 180 day exclusivity period (otherwise known as pay-for-delay settle-

ments) .47
A persistent opponent to the use of these tactics, the FTC routinely invokes

antitrust and unfair competition law to frame legal challenges. In fact, the 2013
Supreme Court case Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis examined pay-fordelay settlements entered into between new drug application (NDA) patent holders and generic applicants, holding that the settlement agreements were not per
48
se illegal but subject to a rule-of-reason analysis. Many are now pointing to
brand pharmaceutical manufacturers use of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation
Strategies as the latest anticompetitive tactic, where drug sponsors are patenting

methods of use to assure safe use of the product and refusing to allow generic

92
92
workshop-fdaftc-workshop-competitive-marketplace-biosimi lars-030 020-030 020

[https://perma.cc/RF8L-MAFK].
4" This discussion excerpted from Jordan Paradise, REMS as A Competitive Tactic: Is Big
PharmaHijackingDrug Access and Patient Safety?, 15 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 43, 46-

47 (2015).
44 See generally, M. Sean Royall, Ashley E. Johnson & Jason C. McKenney, Antitrust
Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical "ProductHopping", 28 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv. 71, 71-77

(2013).
45 See generally, FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONGTERM IMPACT (Aug. 2011).

See generally, Matthew Avery, William Newsom & Brian Hahn, The Antitrust Implications of Filing "Sham" Citizens Petitions with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L. J. 113, 113-152
(2013).
47 See generally, FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: WHEN DRUG COMPANIES AGREE NOT TO
COMPETE https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay
[https://perma.cc/5FKD-H6P6].
48 FTC v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136, 156 (2013). Since the Supreme Court's decision, several
additional cases have arisen questioning the scope of pay-for-delay settlements. See, e.g., In
Re: Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class, 868 F.3d 132, 138 (3d Cir. 2017).
46
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products to copy those methods for use with their own product.49 As Part II explores, the biologic industry (with many of the same players) is also exhibiting
these anticompetitive tactics as the biosimilar, and eventual interchangeable,
marketplace expands. The FDA and FTC collaboration noted above is currently
examining the extent and competitive impact of these activities.
D. Nonuniformity in Dispensing Outcomes

Depending on the state in which a patient resides, the outcome may vary regarding which interchangeable biologic product that patient is dispensed and the
scope and timing of the notification that the patient and physician receive about
that substitution. Relatedly, recent state legislation establishing price caps on

insulin products will also produce variable results. Using insulin as a case study,
Part III will discuss the varying state interchangeable biologic substitution laws
and compare the potential outcomes for patients.
E. Variability in Legal Liability and Remedies

Likewise, depending on the state in which the patient resides, and the product
ultimately dispensed to the patient, state common law liability and remedies may
also vary given the particular jurisdiction. There are two levels to this common

law variability. The first is connected directly to the product the patient receives
from the pharmacist, whether there is liability immunity within the state substitution law, and the scope of that immunity. This article will not explore that level
of variability. The second level of variability results from the range of case law
governing federal preemption of state tort liability in the context of medical
products. Whether a patient receives the innovator biologic or an interchangeable version may impact the availability of a legal remedy. Part IV assesses the
case law regarding state tort liability and federal preemption, highlighting that
there is a pressing need to protect patient and public health through various legal
and regulatory mechanisms.

II. REGULATING

THE INSULIN MARKETPLACE

A. Scope of Productsand Magnitude of Costs

Insulin is a hormone naturally produced within the pancreas that functions to
convert glucose from sugars and starches into energy. 50 The inability to produce
insulin and thus control blood sugar levels leads to several forms of diabetes

49 ALEX BRILL, MATRIX GLOB. ADvISORS, LOsT PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAVINGS FROM USE

OF REMS PROGRAMS TO DELAY GENERIC MARKET ENTRY 2 (2014), http://getmga.com/wp-

content/uploads/2017/02/REMS_StudyJuly.pdf [https://perm.cc/UN8D-3SPF].
so Valencia Higuera, Everything You Need to Know About Insulin,
HEALTHLINE (May 7,
2019), https://www.healthline.com/health/type-2-diabetes/insulin

7E2Y].

[https://perma.cc/TEC4-
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51
mellitus, which left unmanaged can be fatal. In the United States, over 30 million people are afflicted with diabetes and 7.4 million of those utilize insulin. 52
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has identified diabetes as the
53
"largest and fastest growing chronic disease" in the U.S. For those who are
54
uninsured, the costs range from $120 to $400 out of pocket each month. For
those who are insured, coverage is complicated and variable depending on,
among other things: the type of insulin, the use of rebates and discounts, formulary determinations by pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), and the type of
health plan.55

The lifesaving potential of therapeutic insulin dates to 1921 when active in-

sulin was extracted from animal pancreas by researchers from the University of
56
Toronto and later delivered via injection into a 14-year-old patient. The pa57
tient's clinical outcomes vastly improved with successive injections. Now, one
hundred years later, the insulin market has experienced a consistently evolving
range of innovations resulting in a complex spectrum of insulin products available. 58 Following the successful extraction of insulin in 1921, the University of

59
Toronto partnered with Eli Lilly to manufacture the product. The research team
patented the method of production and Eli Lilly was granted the ability to patent
improvements to the process, yet the university retained the patent rights and
licensed the rights. 60 Incremental advancements over the next 50 years led to
longer duration of insulin action, combination of products to allow for single
6
daily injections, and improvements in the safety profile of insulin products. 1

s' These are Type 1 diabetes (typically, though not always, childhood onset), Type 2 diabetes (adult onset), and gestational diabetes. There is also a recognized condition called "prediabetes." CDC, WHAT Is DIABETES? (June 11, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/ba-

sics/diabetes.html [https://perma.cc/YP6C-FTEW].
52 William T. Cefalu et al., Insulin Access and Affordability Working Group: Conclusions
andRecommendations, 41 DIABETES CARE 1299, 1299-1230 (2018), https://care.diabetesjournals.org/content/diacare/41/6/1299.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C39-T6AS].
5

NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS, DIABETES HEALTH COVERAGE: STATE LAWS AND

PROGRAMS (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/diabetes-health-coveragestate-laws-and-programs.aspx [https://perma.cc/CMX6-JECC]
" Jeremy A. Greene & Kevin R. Riggs, Why Is There No GenericInsulin? HistoricalOrigins ofA Modern Problem, 372 N. ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1171 (2015).
5 See generally Cefalu et al., supra note 52.
56 C.H. Best & D.A. Scott, The Preparationof Insulin, 57 J. BIoL. CHEM. 709, 711-12

(1923).
57 Louis Rosenfeld, Insulin: Discovery and Controversy, 48 CLIN. CHEM. 2270, 2278
(2002).
58 Types of Insulin for Diabetes Treatment, WEBMD (July 17, 2020),
https://www.webmd.com/diabetes/diabetes-types-insulin [https://perma.cc/6STW-B5LE].
s9 Greene & Riggs, supra note 54, at 1171.
60

Id. at 1172.

61 Id.
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Accompanying each of these advancements were patents, though many have
long expired.
In 1978, Stanley Cohen and Herbert Boyer utilized recombinant DNA

(rDNA) techniques to genetically engineer human insulin. 62 Shortly thereafter,
Genentech began manufacturing Humulin, a synthetic human insulin and the
first biotechnology product approved by the FDA in 1982.63 The utilization of
rDNA technology introduced vast potential to alter the genetic code in the production of insulin, leading to the development of insulin analogs. 64 The first insulin analog entered the market in 1996, with competition following shortly. 65
The current insulin market includes both synthetic human insulin, which is identical to the structure of human insulin (like Humulin), and insulin analogs, which
are laboratory grown and genetically altered with minor structural changes resulting from amino acid sequencing revisions that enhance their functioning in
various ways.66 Differences in the structure of human insulin and insulin analogs
impact the interactions within the human body, leading to alterations in binding
properties and intracellular signaling.67 Improvements in delivery mechanisms
and absorption rates are typically attributed to insulin analogs. 68
The most recent innovations and improvements in insulin analogs enjoy pa-

tent protection, which is one factor resulting in high prices. 69 The insulin industry is criticized for anticompetitive behaviors prevalent in the pharmaceutical
drug realm, such as aggressive tactics to extend patent life with inconsequential
changes to a product that nevertheless achieve patent protection. 70 Medical experts also urge that given the constant innovation in the insulin realm, drug companies have not thought it worthwhile to attempt a generic version of a product
that may quickly become obsolete.71 However, patent protection and innovation
cycles are not the only factors contributing to high prices. Manufacturing complexities abound as problems of impurities, variation across batches, bacteria or
yeast strain used, degradation and denaturation, and storage condition limitations make production expensive. 72 These complexities in production also

62 Id.
63 Humulin N, NPH, Human Insulin (Recombinant
DNA Origin) Isophane Suspension,
NAT'L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., BEHRING CTR. (last visited Oct. 11, 2020), https://americanhistory.si.edu/collections/search/object/nmah_1000967 [https://perma.cc/8NWE-Q8DT].
64 Greene & Riggs, supra note 54, at 1172.
65 Id.
66 See NAT'L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST., BEHRING CTR., supra note
63.
67 Lutz Heinemann & Marcus Hompesch, BiosimilarInsulins: Basic
Considerations,8 J.

DIABETES

SCI. & TECH. 6, 6 (2014).

68 Greene & Riggs, supra note 54, at 1172.

See, id.
70 Id at 1172 - 73.
71 Id at
e174.
69

72

See

Owens

et al., supra note

10, at 990.
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73
impact antigenicity, bioavailability, and stability of the product, and introduce
74
potential for immunogenic responses to insulin products. Larger molecule biologic drugs, like insulin, are just more complex and introduce additional man75
ufacturing challenges, which result in higher costs to produce. The historical
legal framework for review and approval of insulins is also a contributing factor
to high prices.
There are five basic aspects of insulin products relevant to availability and
cost. First is the time of onset, or how quickly the insulin product acts on the
body. 76 Second is the peak, or the time of the maximum impact of the insulin
78
product. 77 The third is the duration of the effect of the insulin. The fourth is the
concentration; in the U.S. the concentration is a standardized 100 units/ml or
79
U 100 although other concentrations are available. Fifth is the method of delivery: either subcutaneously by injection, intravenously by infusion under medical
supervision, or by inhalation. 80 Insulin products are classified on the market into
the following categories: short-acting, intermediate-acting, rapid-acting, long8
acting, or ultra-rapid-acting. ' Human insulin is typically characterized as short-

acting, intermediate-acting, or fast-acting, while the newer insulin analogs are
82
characterized as rapid-acting or long-acting. The most recent products to enter
83
the market are the ultra-rapid insulin analogs delivered though inhalation. As
the classifications indicate, insulin is not a single FDA-approved product, but
rather a family of products.
The average cost of insulin therapy tripled between the years of 2003 and
2014, and increased by 55% between 2014 and 2019.84 The costs of insulin to

individual patients can vary tenfold depending on the type of insulin, the deliv85
ery method, the dosage, and the formulation. Three manufacturers - Sanofi, Eli

?3 Heinemann & Hompesch, supra note 67, at 8.
74 Owens et al., supra note 10, at 990.

5 Greene & Riggs, supra note 54, at 1172-1173.
76 See Insulin Basics, AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes/medication-management/insulin-other-injectables/insulin-basics

[https://perma.cc/EG2U-DK2P] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
?7 Id.
78

Id.

79 Id.

80 Rima B. Shah et al, Insulin Delivery Methods: Past, Present and Future, 6 INT. J.
PHARM. INVESTIG.

1, 1 (2016).

81 AMERICAN DIABETES ASSOCIATION, supra note 76.

82 Id.
83

Id

84 Benita Lee, How Much Does Insulin Cost? Here's How 23 Brands Compare GoooRx
23, 2019), https://www.goodrx.com/blog/how-much-does-insulin-cost-compare(Aug.
brands/ [https://perma.cc/B8YQ-YGCR].
85 Id.
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Lilly, and Novo Nordisk - dominate the global $27 billion insulin market. 86
While pricing for traditional short-and intermediate-acting insulin has decreased, prices of modern rapid- and long- acting insulin continue to rise, which
is attributable to the heightened difficulties in production and their ability to
more effectively regulate blood-sugar levels. 87 The method of delivery is also a
relevant factor in pricing, with the most utilized choices being subcutaneous syringe and vial, disposable or reusable pens, or portable pumps. 88 The retail prices

of rapid-acting insulins are about 30% higher if a patient opts for pens instead
of vials as delivery methods. 89 Figures 1-3 identify reported insulin retail pricing
across over two dozen brands in the second quarter of 2019 based on the type of
insulin. 90
Figure 1: Retail Prices of TraditionalHuman Insulin 9 1
Dispenser
Price

Insulin Unit
Price

Novolin R vial (10 mL)

$ 93 per vial

$0.09 per unit

Humulin R vial (10 mL)

$185 per vial

$0.19 per unit

Humulin R vial (20 mL, 500 units/mL)

$183 per vial

$0.18 per unit

Humulin R KwikPen (3 mL, 500
units/mL)

$352 per pen

$0.23 per unit

Novolin N vial (10 mL)

$92 per vial

$0.09 per unit

Humulin N vial (10 mL)

$183 per vial

$0.18 per unit

Humulin N KwikPen (3 mL)

$117 per pen

$0.39 per unit

Short-term acting

Intermediate-acting

Figure 2: Retail Prices of Rapid-Acting Insulin Analogs92

86 The Issue with Interchangeable Insulin, HEAT (Oct. 31, 2019), https://heatinformatics.com/posts/issue-interchangeable-insulin [https://perma.cc/5MUC-ZEFC].
87

Lee, supra note 84.

88 Shah et al, supra note 80, at 16.
89 Lee, supra note 84.
90 One unit of insulin is generally the amount of insulin it takes to reduce blood glucose
levels by 50 mg/dL, with the caveat that individual response rates vary. See id.
91 Id.
92

Id.
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Dispenser Price

Insulin Unit
Price

$180 per vial

$0.18 per unit

Generic insulin lispro KwikPen (3 mL)

$72 per pen

$0.24 per unit

Admelog vial (10 mL)

$291 per vial

$0.29 per unit

Admelog SoloStar pen (3 mL)

$187 per pen

$0.37 per unit

Humalog vial (10 mL)

$332 per vial

$0.33 per unit

Humalog KwikPen (3 mL)

$133 per pen

$0.44 per unit

Humalog KwikPen (3 mL, 200
units/mL)

$264 per pen

$0.44 per unit

Humalog cartridge (3 mL)

$132 per cartridge

$0.44 per unit

Humalog junior KwikPen (3 mL)

$129 per pen

$0.43 per unit

Novolog vial (10 mL)

$351 per vial

$0.35 per unit

Novolog FlexPen (3 mL)

$134 per pen

$0.45 per unit

Novolog cartridge (3 mL)

$130 per cartridge

$0.47 per unit

Fiasp vial (10 mL)

$348 per vial

$0.35 per unit

Fiasp FlexTouch pen (3 mL)

$136 per pen

$0.45 per unit

Apidra vial (10 mL)

$362 per vial

$0.36 per unit

Apidra SoloStar pen (3 mL)

$143 per pen

$0.48 per unit

$4.42 per cartridge

$1.11 per unit

Insulin lispro (generic insulin)
Generic insulin lispro vial vial (10

mL)

Insulin aspart

Insulin glulisine

Inhaled insulin
Afrezza cartridge (4 units)
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Figure 3: Retail Prices of Long-Acting Insulin Analogs93
Dispenser
Price

Insulin Unit
Price

Levemir FlexTouch pen (3 mL)

$113 per pen

$0.38 per unit

Levemir vial (10 mL)

$397 per vial

$0.40 per unit

Basaglar KwikPen (3 mL)

$81 per pen

$0.27 per unit

Lantus vial (10 mL)

$340 per vial

$0.34 per unit

Lantus SoloStar pen (3 mL)

$168 per pen

$0.34 per unit

Toujeo pen (1.5 mL, 300 units/mL)

$160 per pen

$0.35 per unit

Toujeo Max pen (3 mL, 300 units/mL)

$315 per pen

$0.35 per unit

Soliqua 100/33 SoloStar pen (3 mL)

$173 per pen

$0.58 per unit

Tresiba vial (10 mL)

$417 per vial

$0.42 per unit

Tresiba FlexTouch pen (3 mL)

$124 per pen

$0.41 per unit

Tresiba FlexTouch pen (3 mL, 200
units/mL)

$248 per pen

$0.41 per unit

Xultophy pen (3 mL)

$254 per pen

$0.85 per unit

Insulin detemir

Insulin glargine

Insulin degludec

There is a robust insulin market, yet competitors almost always enter the market at higher prices than the existing market price (except for short-acting, traditional human insulin products). 94 Innovation in the formulation and delivery

93 Id.

9 Insulins: Prices, Rebates, andOther FactorsInfluencing Costs, PHARMACEUTICAL CARE
(May 8, 2018), https://www.pcmanet.org/insulins-prices-re-

MANAGEMENT AsSOCIATION

bates-and-other-factors-influencing-costs/ [https://perma.cc/K853-EGNQ]. One notable exception was Basaglar, introduced in December 2016 as the first follow-on long-acting insulin.

Id. With the introduction of more follow-on insulins like Basaglar, competing options for
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routes of insulin analogs is contributing to pricing increases, with more recent
products deemed more effective. 95 While the cost of and demand for traditional
human insulin has decreased, insulin analog costs are escalating, chiefly tied to
96
patent protections achieved for the innovations. As one scholar notes "[t]he
main reason why no generic insulin has become available over the past decades
is that incremental innovation has repeatedly precluded the formation of a ge97
neric insulin industry in North America when earlier patents expired." Most

insulin products are subject to protection in the form of patents covering the
98
active ingredient, formulation, and/or delivery device. There is a growing lit-

99
erature critiquing the insulin patent landscape. In addition, innovator biologic

manufacturers may also employ trade secret protections for certain crucial manufacturing techniques, forcing biosimilar competitors to attempt to reverse-en-

gineer them.1 00 Without access to production methods, biosimilar sponsors may
fail to fully understand the biologic's characterization and allow the trade secret
10
to continue indefinitely. 1
The actualization of lower biologic costs alongside implementation of the biosimilar and interchangeable pathways to market has been elusive. While some
economists predicted cost savings like that resulting from the generic drug approval process, others cautioned that the reduction in prices would not be as
profound given the differences in regulatory requirements and costs associated

consumers may drive costs down. See id. There are currently only three follow-on biologic
insulin products on the market. Cefalu, et al, supra note 52, at 1308.
95 Philip W. Lavori, Randall S. Stafford, & Todd H Wagner, New, but Not Improved? IncorporatingComparative-Effectiveness Information into FDA Labeling, 361 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1230, 1230 (2009). Note that prior products are not then removed from the market with
entry of a more effective one and that the FDA does not engage in comparative effectiveness

as part of its review.
96

Heinemann, supra note 9, at 458.

Id.
98 Jing Luo & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Evolution of Insulin Patentsand Market Exclusivities
in the USA, 3 LANCET DIABETES & ENDOCRNOLOGY 835, 836 (2015).
99 See, e.g., Lutz Heinemann, BiosimilarInsulins, 12 EXPERT OP. ON BIOLOGICAL THERAPY
1009, 1009 (2012); Luo & Kesselheim, supra note 98, at 835-37 (2015). One scholar offers
97

that "[h]uman insulin is off patent, is relatively simple to manufacture, and WHO recently
included it in its list of essential medicines in preference to analogue insulin. Generic biosynthetic human insulin would bring down the price of insulin, and several companies have the
capacity to produce it, but progress has been confounded by claims that branded analogue
insulins-which are typically two to four times the cost of branded human insulin-are better
treatment." Edwin A.M. Gale, Commentary: Politics ofAffordable Insulin, 343 BRITISH MED.

J. (2011).

10 0 W.

Nicholson Price & Arti K. Rai, Are Trade Secrets Delaying Biosimilars, 348 SCi.

188, 189 (2015); Luo & Kesselheim, supra note 98, at 837.
10' Price & Rai, supra note 100, at 188-189.
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with biologic products. 0 2 With a current market that includes 29 FDA-approved
biosimilar products as of March 1, 2021,103 the impact on innovator pricing yet

remains unclear, but some urge that the savings have not materialized. 104 In addition, there is accumulating evidence that commercial health plans rarely prefer
biosimilars to their brand-name counterpart.1 05 In fact, one analysis found that
of seventeen of the largest plans in the U.S., the health plans required that patients try a biosimilar before gaining access to the innovator only 14 percent of

the time.1 06 Similarly, health plan decisions to assign preferred formulary status
to the innovator biologic rather than a biosimilar has garnered attention as well.
UnitedHealthcare's preferred formulary status of Amgen's Neulasta over biosimilar versions of pegfilgrastim in exchange for a substantial rebate is one
prime example.1 07 In order for biosimilars including Nivestym, Zarxio, and

Granix to be covered, UnitedHealthcare must provide prior authorization.1 08
UnitedHealthcare's policy does allow for a switch in the event that a treatment
fails or the patient is intolerant to the reference drug. 09 The Association for Accessible Medicines denounced the move as "a step backwards in patient care."" 0
Despite this particular example, the payer community lacks a uniform strategy

for the coverage of biosimilar products."

10 2 Heinemann,
103 FDA,

supra note 9, at 459.

BTOsIMILAR PRODUCT INFORMATION: FDA-APPROVED BIOSTMILAR PRODUCTS

(December 17, 2020) https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-product-information
[https://perma.cc/S82V-LFTA].
104 Ed Silverman, Biosimilars Got the Cold Shoulderfrom Health Plans When It Came to
PreferredCoverage, STAT PHARMALOT (May 20, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/pharma-

lot/2020/05/20/biosimilars-biologics-health-coverage-drug-prices/

[https://perma.cc/55T7-

X7R6].
" 5 See James D. Chambers et al., Coveragefor Biosimilars vs Reference ProductsAmong

U.S. CommercialHealth Plans, 323 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1972, 1972 (2020).
106 Id The analysis involved 535 coverage decisions from 2019 for nine biosimilar products. Id.
107 Cathy Kelly, UnitedHealthcare Coverage Policy Undercutting Neulasta Biosimilars
Draws Concerns, THE PINK SHEET, June 17 2019, at 1.
00

Medical Benefit Drug Policy: White Blood Cell Colony Stimulating Factors,
UNITEDHEALTHCARE (April 1, 2020), https://www.uhcprovider.com/content/dam/provider/docs/public/policies/medicaid-comm-plan/white-blood-celI-colony-stimulating-fac-

tors-cs.pdf [https://perma.cc/URM7-G58F].
109 id

" 0 AAMand the BiosimilarsCouncil Statement on UnitedHealthcareAnnouncement to Reverse Course on Biosimilars, BIOSIMILARS COUNCIL (May 30, 2019), https://biosimilarscouncil.org/news/statement-reverse-course-biosimilars/ [https://perma.cc/U7MM-MFD6].
" McGowan, supra note 35.
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B. The Significance of the "BLA" Switch

Historically, the FDA has regulated insulins as drugs even though insulins fall
within the statutory definition of a biological product. Through intra-agency
agreements, several types of products that technically fall within the definition
of biologic have been regulated as drugs by the FDA, including proteins (such
as insulin) for therapeutic use, monoclonal antibodies, growth factors and en112
The FDA began the
zymes, and non-vaccine therapeutic immunotherapies.
transition of insulin products originally approved under a new drug application

to be deemed licensed under the Public Health Service Act as a biological product in March 2020.113 Following this move, these products may be used as reference products for biosimilar or interchangeable insulin products.' 14 A brief
explanation of the statutory and regulatory differences is warranted here.
Conventional pharmaceutical drugs are small chemical molecules that are rel5
atively simple to characterize and synthesize." The Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) defines a "drug" as articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease; articles intended to affect the
structure or function of the body; and any articles intended for use as components.1 6 The statute also defines a "new drug" which implicates the new drug
approval process for drugs not generally recognized as safe and effective prior
to market entry. 17 New drugs are reviewed by the FDA and approved for the
market through an investigational new drug and new drug application (NDA)
process, the abbreviated drug application (ANDA, also known as generic) process, or the "505(b)(2)" process which involves reference to a prior data set or

publication by another to support a showing of safety and efficacy.1

112

(Feb.

8

The Center

Transfer of TherapeuticProductsto the Centerfor Drug Evaluationand Research, FDA

2, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-eValuation-and-research-

cber/transfer-therapeutic-products-center-drug-eValuation-and-research-cder

[https://perma.cc/WM6D-67GQ].
13 21 C.F.R. § 601 (2019).
" 4 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICs EVALUATION AND RESEARCH,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON BIOSIMILAR DEVELOPMENT AND THE BPCI ACT (2018); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FDA, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND
RESEARCH, CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, NEW AND REVISED DRAFT
Q&AS ON BIOSIMILAR DEVELOPMENT AND THE BPCI ACT (REVISION 2), CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH (2018).

See Jordan Paradise, The Legal and Regulatory Status of Biosimilars: How Product
Naming and State Substitution Laws May Impact the United States Healthcare System, 41
"

5

AM. J. L. & MED. 49, 68 (2015).
11621 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1).
11721 U.S.C. § 321(p); 21 U.S.C. § 355.
11821 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); § 355(b)(2); § 355(j).
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for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) oversees drug review and approv-

.als.119

Biologics are larger macromolecules derived from living sources such as

microorganisms, animals, and humans. Biologics are defined according to
their source as:
a virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, vaccine, blood, blood component or derivative, allergenic product, protein (except any chemically

synthesized polypeptide), or analogous product, or arsphenamine or derivative of arsphenamine (or any other trivalent organic arsenic com-

pound), applicable to the prevention, treatment, or cure of a disease or
condition of human beings. 120
The FDA groups biologics generally as allergenics, blood and blood products,
cellular and gene therapy products, proteins (as of March 23, 2020), tissue and
tissue products, vaccines, and xenotransplantation.1

21

Biologic approval is over-

seen by either the Center for Biologic Evaluation and Research (CBER) or
CDER depending on the product type.1 22 Because biologics are governed by the

Public Health Service Act (PHSA) rather than the FDCA, review and approval
for biologics proceed through an investigational application and biologic license
application, or BLA, based on "safety, purity, and potency." 123
Unlike the FDCA with intricate, rigorous requirements provided within the
statute itself, the PHSA provides very general language and discretion to the

agency to fill in the details of BLA requirements through rulemaking or policy.
Congress by legislation brought the new drug and biologic approval processes

into harmonization in 1997 to require demonstrations of safety and efficacy
through clinical trials and similar measures of product information submission. 124 There are important distinctions between the NDA and BLA process that

are outside the scope of this article. Ultimately, a BLA is issued by the FDA
after finding that product is safe, pure, and potent as assured through manufacturing practices; it also incorporates classical FDCA provisions and structures

19

' Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/fdaorganization/center-drug-evaluation-and-research-cder [https://perma.cc/8ZZV-DQBF].

12042 U.S.C. § 262(0). The word "protein" was added by the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act as part of the larger Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This

addition is the trigger for the shifting of insulin, a protein, from regulation as a drug to regulation as a biologic. Approval Pathway for Biosimilar Biological Products, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 7002(b), 124 Stat. 814.
121 What Are "Biologics" Questions and Answers, FDA (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-biologics-evaluation-and-research-cber/what-are-bio-

logics-questions-and-answers [https://perma.cc/DKA5-JHD5]
122 FDA, supra note 119.
12342 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(C)(II).
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) & note (2006) (Amendments).
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of NDAs, including clinical trial requirements, post-market requirements, and
25
enforcement mechanisms for violations of the statute or regulations. 1
Biologics have enjoyed lucrative returns, with prices vastly exceeding that of

small molecule drugs. In 2018, most of the top-selling therapeutic products were
biologics, with Abbvie's Humira (adalimumab) grabbing the top slot with $21
billion in sales and Amgen's Enbrel (etanercept) at $7.3 billion in third. 126 As of
May 2020, there are five approved biosimilar versions of Humira (adalimumab)
and two for Enbrel (etanercept). The twenty-nine approved biosimilars mimic
the following innovator products: Humira (six), Herceptin (five), Remicade
(four), Neulasta (four), Enbrel (two), Rituxan (three), Avastin (two), Neupogran
27
(two), and Epogen (one).1 As noted earlier, Neulasta has responded to biosim-

ilar competition by offering rebates to health plans in return for preferred formulary status.

As insulin is now transitioning to a biologic product, competitors will be able
to pursue the biosimilar or interchangeable route to market established in the
BPCIA. Biosimilar status requires that the product is "highly similar" to the reference biologic notwithstanding any minor differences in the clinically inactive
components of the product and that there are no clinically meaningful differ28
ences between the two products in terms of safety, purity, and potency.1 The
heightened status of interchangeability requires that the product is biosimilar and
that the product can be substituted for the reference product without intervention
from the prescriber. 129 The statutory provisions again give discretion to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, delegated to the FDA,
to issue guidance regarding standards and criteria and implement approval pro-

cesses utilizing public comment rather than notice and comment rulemaking.
This is notably divergent from the notice and comment rulemaking required in

2

42 U.S.C. §262(j); Public Health Service Act §351(j). ("The Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act [21 U.S.C. 301 et seq.], including the requirements under sections 505(o),
505(p), and 505-1 of such Act [21 U.S.C. 355(o), (p), 355-1], applies to a biological product
1 1See

subject to regulation under this section, except that a product for which a license has been
approved under subsection (a) shall not be required to have an approved application under

section 505 of such Act.").
126 Top Best Selling Drugs in

2018,

BOC

Scis.

BLOG

(Jan.

23,

2018),

https://www.bocsci.com/blog/index.php/top 10-best-selling-drugs-in-2018/
[https://perma.cc/4J8M-44EC].
12 7 BiosimilarProduct Information: FDA-Approved Biosimilar Products, FDA (Dec. 17,

https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-product-information
at
2020)
[https://perma.cc/BE8W-BHHK].
12842 U.S.C. §262(i)(2); Public Health Service Act §351(i)(2).
12942 U.S.C. §262(i)(3); Public Health Service Act §351(i)(3).
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the FDCA for implementation of new drug requirements and innovator biologic
requirements.' 3 0 On this point, one commentator offers:
To be clear, Congress has provided that the FDA can issue extensive regulations with far-reaching economic effects over a period of ten years using
only guidance-plus documents, which ostensibly have no binding legal effect. Such guidance-plus documents cannot be considered mere policy documents. Scholars and the Congressional Budget Office expect the guidances to have billion-dollar consequences. [citation omitted] 3
In addition, the statute creates a process for resolution of patent disputes distinct from the process set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act for generic drug prod-

ucts. Patent protection prohibits biosimilar market entry until the patent expires
or a competitor is successful in the complicated patent process laid out in the
statute. Rather than a public posting of innovator patents in the Orange Book

and corresponding ability to file a paragraph IV certification and force litigation
of potentially invalid patents, the BPCIA lays out a private disclosure between
the biosimilar and innovator biologic by which to identify potential for patent
litigation and undertake the resulting actions. The FDA has implemented a "Purple Book" that simply lists approved biosimilar and interchangeable products.
There is no patent information provided, nor is it information required for a BLA
applicant to submit. There is a 12-year period of exclusivity provided for inno-

vator biologics and one year of data exclusivity for the first interchangeable biologic product; biosimilars receive no exclusivity on the market.
As means to implement the BPCIA, the FDA has installed a Biosimilar Implementation Committee co-chaired by Directors of CBER and CDER that is

responsible for coordination of the implementation activity; the Office of New
Drugs (OND) has created Director for Biosimilars, a biosimilar review committee has been created within CDER to advise OND, and the FDA has solicited
and responded to public comment across a variety of topics. Reflected in their
guidance documents, the FDA has embraced a "totality of the evidence" approach to review of biosimilar and interchangeable products. The FDA has issued guidance documents on eight topics relating to the BPCIA.13 2 Three

13o Jonathan Stroud, The Illusion of Interchangeability:The Benefits and
Dangersof Guidance -Plus Rulemaking in the FDA's BiosimilarApproval Process, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 599,

632 (2011).
31
1 1d. at 633.

132 The range

of topics include questions and answers on BPCIA implementation, general
scientific considerations in demonstrating biosimilarity, quality considerations in demonstrat-

ing biosimilarity to a reference protein product, clinical pharmacology data to support biosimilarity, product licensure for fewer than all conditions of use of the reference biologic
product, nonproprietary naming standards, considerations in demonstrating interchangeabil-

ity, and clinical immunogenicity considerations for biosimilar and interchangeable insulin
products See Biosimilars Guidances, FDA (June 21, 2019), https://www.fda.gov/vaccines-

140
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guidance documents are particularly relevant to insulin products. The guidance
document NonproprietaryNaming of BiologicalProducts sets forth the FDA's

policy on the use of a four-letter suffix following the biologic established name
for biosimilar products.1 33 For example, the established name for Abrilada, a
biosimilar version of Humira (adalimumab) is adalimumab-afzb. The guidance
also provides that for interchangeable products, the agency also "intends to designate a proper name that is a combination of the core name and a distinguishing
134
suffix that is devoid of meaning and composed of four lowercase letters."
However, the agency "does not intend to apply the naming convention described

in the Naming Guidance to biological products that are [products originally ap35
proved as drugs and being transitioned to biologic status]."1 This applies to
insulin products, which means that any interchangeable insulin will not conform
to the suffix requirement but will be subject to some yet-to-be-determined FDA
naming regime. The FDA held a public meeting on the topic of the impending
switch of insulin to biologics in 2019, which informed the development of the
136
FDA's guidance.
In the guidance Considerations in Demonstrating Interchangeability, the
agency offers its perspective on the development and review of therapeutic pro37
tein interchangeable products.1 The document offers a generally vague framework, directing industry that the agency will use a "totality of the evidence"

approach in tailoring a case-by-case approach as they begin reviewing and ap38
proving interchangeable products.1 In one significant change from the draft

document that garnered attention from industry, the final guidance provides that
foreign reference products may be used in interchangeability switching studies
to support approval where applicants establish a scientific bridge to the reference
39
product that is licensed in the U.S.1 Finally, in Clinical Immunogenicity
blood-biologics/general-biologics-guidances/biosimilars-guidances [https://perma.cc/68XFEM7F].
33
1 See Nonproprietary Naming of Biological Products: Update, FDA (Mar. 2019),
https://www.fda.gov/media/121316/download [https://perma.cc/YG9Z-V3ZB].
34

1d. at 1.
13 See Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCI Act) § 7002(e)(4)
(sections 7001 through 7003 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. 111148)).
36
Zachary Brennan, InterchangeableInsulins: FDA Holds Public Meeting RAPS (Mar.
1

13, 2019), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-articles/2019/5/interchangeable-in-

sulins-fda-holds-public-meeting [https://perma.cc/8CQC-WUP4].
37
? Considerations in DemonstratingInterchangeabilitywith A Reference Product: Guidance for Industry, FDA (May 2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/124907/download

[https://perma.cc/3XKH-5X6P].
38

1 1d. at 3.

139 Sue Sutter, Biosimilar InterchangeabilitySwitching Studies May Use ForeignComparators, US FDA Says, PINK SHEET, May 20, 2019, at 1; Considerationsin DemonstratingInterchangeability,supra note 137.
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Considerationsfor Biosimilarand InterchangeableInsulin Products the FDA

represents its thinking on showing "whether and when comparative clinical immunogenicity studies may be needed to support licensure of proposed biosimilar
and interchangeable recombinant human insulins, recombinant human insulin
mix products, and recombinant insulin analog products." 140
The U.S. has been slower to develop the pathways to market for biosimilar
products than the European Union yet has taken some direction from the E.U.
policy in this realm. The European Medicines Agency (EMA) has issued guidance that requires biosimilar products compare the biosimilar and the authorized
reference product based on a quality, non-clinical, and clinical evaluation.1 41 In
addition to pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic studies required to demonstrate equivalence differences, the EMA also requires immunogenicity testing
as a part of the approval process.1 42 The EMA has issued 12 product-specific

guidelines for individual classes of therapeutics1 43 rather than general guidance
documents that apply across all product types. Notably, both the EMA and the
FDA mandate robust post-market pharmacovigilance in the evaluation of the
safety and efficacy of biosimilars.144 Due to the nature of manufacturing biosimilar insulin products, extra caution is necessary to ensure the safety and efficacy
of insulin analogs, making post-market pharmacovigilance equally as important
as pre-market clinical evaluations.
In general, as a result of FDA guidance, a biosimilar can be licensed once the
manufacturer can demonstrate the product's safety and efficacy from chemophysical studies, animal studies, and clinical studies including immunogenicity
assessments.1 45 The evaluation of biosimilars is still a case-by-case evaluation
in the U.S., and thus, the process lacks standardization.1 46 In the case of insulin,
clinical studies will focus particularly on immunogenicity as a marker.1 47 For
insulin analogs, these immunogenicity studies look specifically at the

140 Clinical Immunogenicity Considerations for Biosimilar and Interchangeable Insulin
Products: Draft Guidance for Industry, 84 Fed. Reg. 65822 (Nov. 29, 2019).

141 H. A. Dowlat, M. K. Kuhlmann, H. Khatami & F. J. Amupudia-Blasco, Interchangeability Among Reference Insulin Analogues and Their Biosimilars: Regulatory Framework
Study Design and Clinical Implications, 18 DIABETES, OBESITY AND METABOLISM: A J. OF
PHARMACOLOGY AND THERAPEUTICS 737, 738 (2016).
12Id.
43

Id.

144Id

at 741.

45 Heinemann & Hompesch, supra note 67, at 11.

&

' 46 See Alan W. Carter, In the BiosimilarMarketplace Will There Be 50 Ways to Leave
Your Insulin?, 10 J. DIABETES, Scr. & TECH. 1188, 1189 (2016); David R. Owens, Wolfgang
Landgraf, Andrea Schmidt, Reinhard G. Bretzel & Martin K. Kuhlmann, The Emergence of
Biosimilar Insulin Preparations - A Cause for Concern?, 14 DIABETES, TECH.
THERAPEUTICS 989, 990 (2012).
4 Dowlat et al., supranote 141, at 742.
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The biologic industry has taken issue
formulations of anti-insulin antibodies.
with some of the FDA's approaches to interchangeable products, as well as with
149
their relevant guidance documents.

C. Toward InterchangeableInsulin

The FDA has not yet approved any interchangeable product, nor are there any
150
true biosimilar insulins on the market. Insulin interchangeability, while pro15 1
jected to be imminent, is at least a few years out. There does seem to be some
movement for biosimilar insulin thus far with several companies representing
15 2
For example, Boehringer Ingelheim has
that products are in development.
publicly disclosed that it is seeking such status for an adalimumab biosimilar
54
product. 153 Clinical trials have begun in several hundred patients.1 Abbvie's
Humira is the biologic reference product, with its key patent set to expire in

2023.155 By achieving interchangeability status, the product may then be substi156
Each state law sets
tuted under state laws without prescriber involvement.
forth conditions for the substitution and there is marked variability across enacted state laws, discussed infra in Part III.
The FDA

has,

however, approved

competitor products

through

the

"505(b)(2)" NDA process, which is a hybrid mechanism that combines clinical
trial aspects with use of publicly available third-party information to support a
57 For example, the agency approved a
showing of safety and efficacy.1

148 Id.
149 Michael

Mezher, Industry Groups Debate FDA's Approach to InterchangeableInsulin
Products, RAPS, (June 5, 2019), https://www.raps.org/news-and-articles/news-arti[https://perma.cc/CF7Kcles/2019/6/industry-groups-debate-fdas-approach-to-interchan

9P88].
" John White and Jennifer Goldman, Biosimilar and Follow-on Insulin: The Ins, Outs,
and Interchangeability,35 J. PHARMACY & TECH. 25, 25, 31 (2019).
151 See generally, id at 29, 33.

152 1d.
153 Brennan, supra note

1.

" 4 The VOL TAIRE-X TrialLooks at the Effect ofSwitching Between Humira andBI 695501
in Patients With Plaque Psoriasis, CLINICAL TRIALS (Apr. 13, 2020), http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT03210259 [https://perma.cc/KFT4-Y9MF].
'5 In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., No. 19-CV-1873, 2020 WL 3051309, at
*6 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2020), appeal docketed, No. 20-2402 (7th Cir. July 30, 2020).
156

Biosimilar and Interchangeable Biologics: More Treatment Choices, FDA (Mar. 23,

2020), https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumer-updates/biosimilar-and-interchangeablebiologics-more-treatment-choices [https://perma.cc/HY8M-YPTS].
15721 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2); FDA, CLINICAL IMMUNOGENICITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR
BIOSIMILAR AND INTERCHANGEABLE INSULIN PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, DRAFT

GUIDANCE, (2019) https://www.fda.gov/media/133014/download

[https://perma.cc/E4NT-

AT8W]. The FDA noted the following in the interchangeable insulin guidance document:
"FDA has approved many insulin products in NDAs submitted pursuant to section 505(b)(1)
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competitor product to the insulin glargine Lantus in June 2020 using the hybrid

regulatory pathway for new drugs rather than as either a generic or biosimilar. 158
The resulting product can technically be called a "follow-on product" because it
references Lantus in comparative studies within its application, but it is not a
biosimilar. 159 Once approved, the NDA status was immediately deemed to be
BLA status given the regulatory transition. 160 The FDA also approved several

other products, such as the insulin glargine Basaglar (follow-on to Lantus) in
2015 and lispro Admelog (follow-on to Humalog) in 2017, in this manner. 16 1

As the FDA transitions insulin from drug to biologic regulation, the agency
has made clear that none of the insulins that achieved approval as a new drug
either through the full NDA process or the 505(b)(2) process will be eligible for
biosimilar status without affirmative approval. 162 Given the time and expense to
undertake clinical trials to demonstrate biosimilarity, many anticipate that the
transition could mean at least a year delay in any kind of interchangeable product. 163 A delay, but inevitably there will be an interchangeable insulin marketplace. 164 The realized reduction in pricing is not expected to rival the price reductions that accompanied generics. 165 The price reductions for biosimilar
insulin products are predicted to be between twenty to forty percent, which is a
large decrease from the cost savings of the first market entry of a small-molecule
generic. 166 While the market introduction of biosimilar versions of insulin will

of 79 the FD&C Act. FDA also has approved "follow-on" insulin products in NDAs submitted
pursuant to the abbreviated approval pathway described in section 505(b)(2) of the FD&C
Act."
Id
See
generally
What
is
502(b)(2)?,
CAMARGo
BLOG,
https://camargopharma.com/resources/what-is-505b2/

[https://perma.cc/XF2L-G3FB] (last

visited Sept. 24, 2020).
"8 Brian Orelli, Mylan and Biocon Gain FDA Approval for Insulin Equivalent to Sanofi 's
Lantus, THE MOTLEY FOOL (June
12, 2020),
https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/06/12/mylan-and-biocon-gain-fda-approval-for-insulin-equ.aspx
[https://perma.cc/T296-ABUB].
59
See id. Some sources mistakenly conflate biosimilar status with follow-on status. They
are different. There are no biosimilar or interchangeable insulins listed in the Purple Book.
See generally Purple Book search for biosimilar and interchangeable insulins., THE PURPLE
BOOK, https://purplebooksearch.fda.gov/ [https://perma.cc/S2NF-YHWU] (enter query using
the proprietary or nonproprietary name in the search bar to find biosimilar or interchangeable

insulins).
16 0 See

DRUGS@FDA:

FDA

APPROVED

DRUGS,

cessdata. fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index. cfi?event=BasicSearch.process
[https://perma.cc/86F2-XERE] (last visited Sept. 24, 2020).
161 White, supra note 150, at 29-30.

1 Id.

163 HEAT,

supra note 86.
164 White, supra note 150, at 29-30.
165 See Heinemann, supra note 9, at 459.

166Id

https://www.ac-
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induce a reduction in pricing, some point out that those savings may be offset by
67
the need for long-term post-market surveillance and other regulatory costs.
III. RESTRICTING THE INSULIN INDUSTRY THROUGH STATE LEGISLATION

A. InterchangeableBiologic Substitution Laws

Once the FDA does approve an interchangeable biologic-whether insulin or
another product-legislation in forty-four states establish mechanisms and requirements for substitution of the interchangeable version for the innovator biologic. 168 These state substitution laws vary in their requirements regarding key
provisions such as prescriber and patient notification, record keeping, and information requirements. 169 Additionally, different state laws afford pharmacists
different levels of legal immunity.17 0 The BPCIA requires the FDA to approve
interchangeable status and issue a license prior to allowing substitution of inter71
changeable products.1
Most of the states with interchangeable biologic substitution laws designate a
role for the prescriber to determine whether to allow substitution, where the prescriber has the authority to prevent substitution by an indication on the prescription.1 72 These provisions address whether and how the prescribing practitioner
signals to the pharmacist that the product is not to be substituted for an inter174
changeable biosimilar product.17 3 States vary in the means to accomplish this.
For example, both the Illinois and New York laws state that substitution is allowed where the prescriber "does not designate" that a substitution is prohibited; 1 7 5 Illinois's law specifically notes that this designation may be achieved
"orally, in writing, or electronically." 7 6 North Carolina, on the other hand,

16687 See id. at 461

1 See generally Richard Cauchi, State Laws andLegislation Related to Biologic Medications and Substitution of Biosimilars, NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS (May

3, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-legislation-related-to-biologicmedications-and-substitution-of-biosimilars.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZN9B-USK8]. The National Conference of State Legislators also maintains an overview and tally of these laws. Id.
See Paradise, supra note 115, for a comprehensive early analysis of the first eight of these

laws.

16 9 See Cauchi, supra note 168.
17 0 See id.
171 See 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3).
172 Cauchi, supra note 168. At least thirty-three states designate such a role for the prescriber within the express text of the law. Id.
173 White, supranote 150, at 29-30.
.

174d

'75 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85 / 19.5(b)(2) (2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW

2012).
176 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85 / 19.5(b)(2) (2016).

§

6816-A (McKinney
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requires a preprinted prescription form containing two signature lines where the

prescriber must sign above either "Product Selection Permitted" or "Dispense as
Written." 7 7 Finally, at least four states do not affirmatively allow the prescriber
to block substitution with a "brand medically necessary" or "do not substitute"
notation.1 78

Notification provisions deal with whether the pharmacist must inform either
the patient (or authorized individual presenting the prescription) or the prescribing practitioner in the event of substitution. Forty-four states with interchangeable substitution legislation have an express provision requiring notification or

communication to prescribers where a substitution occurs. 7 9 A practitioner's
ability to prohibit substitution is inherent in both the practice of medicine doctrine and the traditional respect for the doctor-patient relationship.1 80 Depending
on the language contained in the legislation, many argue that this aspect may
prove unnecessarily restrictive to substitution and hinder cost savings.18 ' The
industry is divided about the implications of physician notification require-

ments. 182 For example, Hospira supported physician notification early on in its
own capacity and on behalf of eighteen companies advocating such a position.1 83

The Hospira position urges that notification alerts the treating physician to the
medication switch in order to provide better subsequent care to the patient.1 84
The generic drug association GPhA counters that notification will signal to patients and physicians that interchangeable biosimilar products are not the same
as, or even inferior to, the brand product.1 85 This position dovetails with the recent FDA-FTC collaborative effort to combat industry activities that have this
anticompetitive impact.1 86

17 7

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.85.28(b)(2) (2015).

17 8 See Cauchi, supra note 168. Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and North Carolina. Id.
179 1d. Maine's legislation is narrow in scope and does not relate to dispensing of interchangeable products; it functions to require brand manufacturers to allow access to their drugs
through sale for purposes of developing a generic drug. It's not entirely clear why the Maine
statute is listed along with the other state laws here. See id
'See

Brian F. King, Emerging Market for Biosimilars: State Legislation Should

Reconcile Biosimilar Substitution Laws with Existing Laws on Generic Substitution, 18
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 31, 43 (2016).
181 See id

182 See

id at 39.
18 3 Brenda Sandburg, Waitingfor Biosimilars: From Manufacturing to Litigation, Stakeholders Preparefor United States Market, THE PINK SHEET, June 16, 2014, at 19, 20. The

coalition included Actavis, Amgen, Genentech, and Sandoz, among others. Id
84
Id.
85

1

1d.

186 HAHN & SIMONS, supra note 40.
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As to the timing of the notification to the physician, twenty-three states ex87
pressly require prescriber notification within five days;' seven expressly re188
quire notification within three days; two expressly require notification within

19 0
The retwo days;1 89 and one expressly requires notification within 24 hours.

maining laws do not specify a timeframe, set a "reasonable" timeframe, or do
not address prescriber notification at all.'91 States that enacted their automatic
substitution provisions in 2015 or later tend to utilize the term "communication"

instead of "notification," and most allow for entry of the information into electronic health records, pharmacy benefit manager (PBM) records, or pharmacy
92
records available to the prescriber.1 Many of the laws also provide that notification by means of telephone, facsimile, or other electronic means is acceptable.1 93 These prescriber notification requirements address concerns of maintaining good pharmacovigilance practice, as do the various record-keeping
94
requirements contained in most statutes.' These allow for some form of postmarket surveillance of interchangeable insulins to monitor potential adverse effects and long-term safety and efficacy concerns for the particular patient, data
95
which can then be aggregated to signal widespread adverse reactions.1 States
without record-retention and prescriber notification requirements may make
monitoring adverse events related to prescription of interchangeable insulins
96
more difficult.1
Beyond prescriber notification requirements and the ability of a prescriber to
block substitution, some states include provisions targeted at informing patients
about whether their treatment has been substituted with an interchangeable biologic.1 97 Only a few state laws expressly allow the patient the right to refuse
98
substitution after being informed of the availability of an interchangeable.'
Nine states do not expressly require that the patient be notified of the substitution.199 Of the states that do require patient notification, the manner of

187 Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. Cauchi, supra note 168.

'Is Alaska, Connecticut, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oregon, and Texas. Id.
I89 Georgia and Hawaii. Id
19 0 North Dakota. Id
19' Id.

192 Id.
'93

194

See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5(c) (2016).
See White, supra note 150, at 32.

195 Id.

19 6 d.
197 See,

e.g., Texas. Cauchi, supra note 168.

198 See, e.g., Virginia. Id
199 Alaska, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and North
Carolina. Id

INSULIN FEDERALISM

20211]

147

notification varies: some stipulate that it must be done prior to dispensing, 200
others identify a particular source to make the notification (e.g., within the electronic health record) 201 or include vague language to "inform" the patient. 202 As
an offshoot of informing the patient of the substitution, some states have implemented requirements to convey the difference in cost between the originator biologic and the interchangeable or more direct cost-control requirements. 203 For
instance, the enacted laws in Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina and
Texas require that any authorized or allowable substitution have a lower cost
than the prescribed biologic. 204 These cost-control requirements were likely implemented to align automatic substitutions with the goal of increasing market
competition.205

The three most relevant features of these state laws for eventual tort liability
are the notification requirements to prescribers, the notification requirement to
patients, and whether the prescriber can block substitution with a "brand medically necessary" or similar notation. 206 Figure 4 depicts three representative state
laws for comparative purposes.
Figure 4: Select State InterchangeableBiologic Substitution Laws
State
Prescriber
Patient
Prescriber Substitution Block
ID207

Notification
Yes (5 days)

Notification
No

IL 208

Yes (5 days)

Yes

Yes - may "designate that substitution is prohibited"

NC 209

Yes (reasonable time)

No

Yes - must select "dispense as
written" or "product selection
permitted" line to sign

200

No

See, e.g., Indiana. Id

See, e.g., California. Id

20!
202

See, e.g., New Mexico. Id.

Id.

203

Id

204
5

20 Anne Park Kim & Ross Jason Bindler, The Future of BiosimilarInsulins, 29 DIABETES

161, 164 (2016).
See discussion infra Part IV.
207 IDAHO CODE § 54-1769 (2020).

SPECTRUM
206

208225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5 (2016).
209

N.C. GEN. STAT. 90-85.28 (1982).
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These three features are directly relevant to the liability of manufacturers for
2 10
negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn claims. Depending on the provisions within the given state law, a patient may be given an interchangeable
product without their knowledge, there may be delayed notice to the prescriber
of the substitution, or the complete inability of the prescriber to direct the pharmacist not to substitute, all of which could have dangerous consequences for the
patient.

Because only follow-on insulins approved through the traditional NDA process have been available in markets up until this point, which are not interchangeable, patient and physician anecdotes relating to switches to biosimilar
211
Without clear information on biosimilar and
insulins are not widely available.
and pharmacists may all face conphysicians,
patients,
options,
interchangeable
designated as biosimilar or interchoices
of
number
increased
an
with
fusion
2 12
(about 70%) are comfortable
physicians
most
While
versions.
changeable
with the option of prescribing FDA-approved biosimilars to new patients, there

are support and retraining considerations that need to be taken into consideration
when switching existing patients from their current therapies to biosimilar or

interchangeable insulin. 213 Physicians who have worked with established insulin
markets for years may be more reluctant to switch to biosimilar insulins, espe2 14
cially with pending safety concerns. Patients who must pay for insulin them215
One study of diabetes paselves support the availability of cheaper insulin.
open to consideration of
are
patients
most
while
that
revealed
tient populations
would need to be proacmanufacturers
insulins,
interchangeable
biosimilar and
administration of the
and
efficacy,
safety,
about
concerns
patient
address
to
tive
biologic. 2 16
innovator
the
to
compared
as
product
interchangeable
or
biosimilar
If we return to the hypothetical patient presented at the beginning of the arti-

cle, we can explore the inconsistency in outcomes depending on the provisions
in the state law. As an educated and well-informed diabetic, perhaps our patient
is aware that insulin is now a biologic after being transferred from drug status.
They may also understand that their pharmacist cannot substitute their doctor's
prescription for a generic product because there is no such thing as "generic"
insulin products. 217 However, they likely do not realize that because insulin is

2 10

See discussion infra Part IV.

211 White & Goldman, supra note

150, at 29-30.
See generally, Heinemann & Hompesch, supra note 67.
213 White & Goldman, supra note 150, at 32.
214 Heinemann, supra note 9, at 461.
2 12

215
1d.
216

at 460.
Alasdair R. Wilkins et al., PatientPerspectives on BiosimilarInsulin, 8 J. DIABETES SCI.

& TECH. 23, 25 (2014).
217

Generic drug status is demonstrated using measures of bioequivalence to the innovator

reference product. For biologics, a biosimilar is measured as "highly similar" to the reference
innovator biologic product. For interchangeable status, the FDA must determine that in
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now a biologic, there are potentially 50 different substitution laws in place at the
state level that will apply once an insulin product achieves interchangeable status. 218 Using the three state laws depicted in Figure 4 as models, the variations
among them result in strikingly different outcomes for the patient.
In Illinois, the process of interchangeable substitution contains all three core

requirements depicted in Figure 4: prescriber notification within a specified time
period, patient notification, and the ability of the prescriber to block substitution. 219 Notably, the Illinois law also requires that for the law to apply, the product must have been licensed and met interchangeable status or the FDA must
"[have] determined [the product] is therapeutically equivalent as set forth in the
latest edition of or supplement to the United States Food and Drug Administration's Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book)." 220 The law provides that if the prescribing physician "does not

designate orally, in writing, or electronically" that substitution is not allowed,
the substitution may proceed. 221 The law also requires that the pharmacy "in-

forms the patient of the substitution" yet provides no specific mechanism of
communication to the patient2 22 The prescriber must be notified within five days
of the substitution, including specific product and manufacturer information,
through either interoperable electronic medical record system, electronic prescribing technology, a pharmacy benefit manager system, or a pharmacy rec-

ord. 223 The law also allows communication through fax, phone, electronic submission, "or other prevailing means." 224

Idaho's law provides many of the same provisions and language for notification to the prescriber, timing of notification as within five days, and alternate
means of communication to the prescriber. 225 Unlike Illinois's law, however, the
Idaho law provides that the prescriber cannot block substitution with a notation
on the script, at least by the provisions included in the statute. 226 Also noticeably

absent is any mention of notification to the patient when the pharmacist substitutes an interchangeable product.2 27

addition to satisfying the highly similar status, the product must also be able to be substituted
in the case of a patient without concern about harm. BiosimilarandInterchangeableProducts,

FDA (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/drugs/biosimilars/biosimilar-and-interchangeable-products#interchange [https://perma.cc/67BL-GFDT].
218

See Cauchi, supra note 168.
219225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5 (2016).
220 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5(a)(2) (2016).
221225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5(b)(2) (2016).
222225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5(b)(3) (2016).
223225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5(c)(1)-(4) (2016).
224 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/19.5(c) (2016).
2 25
IDAHO CODE § 54-1769(1) (2020).
22 6
22 7

See IDAHO CODE
See Id.

§

54-1769 (2020).
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In North Carolina, the prescriber must be notified within a "reasonable time"
of the substitution rather than a specific time frame, leaving the judgment on
reasonableness up for interpretation. 228 Like both Illinois's and Idaho's laws,
North Carolina's law requires the product be "determined by the United States
Food and Drug Administration to meet the standards set forth in 42 U.S.C. §
262(k)(4) or deemed therapeutically equivalent by the United States Food and
Drug Administration." 229 As mentioned earlier, North Carolina's law offers two
choices for the prescriber regarding substitution that the prescriber must select
in writing the patient script by attaching a signature over either "Product Selec230
This either-or selection requirement
tion Permitted" or "Dispense as Written."
on the prescription paperwork prompts the physician to consider the substitution

issue, whereas the Illinois law is written that the prescriber may "designate... that
substitution is prohibited." 231North Carolina's law contains no express provision for notification to the patient of the substitution. North Carolina's law also
provides an example of pharmacist liability, where substitution pursuant to the

law "shall impose no greater liability upon the pharmacists for selecting the dispensed drug or biologic product or upon the prescriber of the same than would
be incurred by either for dispensing the drug or biological product specified in
the prescription." 232
Thus, for our hypothetical insulin patient described in Part I, the following
outcomes are possible, depending on the state. In Illinois, the physician may

refuse substitution and is fully informed of any substitution within a five-day
timeframe, and the patient has the most complete information with which to de233
cide upon a course of treatment. The patient may affirmatively refuse the substitution and opt for the originally scripted insulin product. Coupled with the
recently enacted insulin price cap law in Illinois, this is the best outcome with
respect to transparency and ultimate cost. Where the patient does opt instead for
the insulin prescribed, the costs will be limited to $100 per month where the
234
patient has an individual health insurance plan. See Part II.B., below, for discussion of these insulin price laws.
In Idaho, it is not expressly provided that the prescriber may prevent substitution and it is unclear whether the pharmacist will consider any notation on the
235
Where there is substitution, the
script when substituting under the law.

228
N.C.
229
230

GEN. STAT. § 90-85.28(b2) (2020).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.27(3a) (2020).

231

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.28(b)(1) (2020).
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85 / 19.5 (2020).

232

N.C. GEN. STAT.

23 3

See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85 / 19.5 (b)(2) (2020); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85 / 19.5 (c)

§ 90-85.31 (2020).

(2020).
2
1 Pricing Prescription Insulin Act, Pub. Act 101-0625, 2019 Il. Legis. Serv. 6. (West)
(codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375 / 6.11 (2020)).
23 See IDAHO CODE § 54-1769(1) (2020).
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prescriber must be informed of the substitution within five days. 236 However,
the pharmacist is not expressly obligated to inform the patient of the substitution
and thus it is also unclear what will happen if the patient attempts to opt out if
and when he or she becomes aware of the interchangeable substitution. 237
In North Carolina, the prescriber must select for one of two substitution options in writing the script, which affirmatively requires that the prescriber con-

sider the issue of substitution. 238 If the prescriber does not indicate "dispense as
written" but rather "product selection permitted", the pharmacist must notify the
physician of that substitution within a vague "reasonable time." 239 It is unclear
what may be deemed "reasonable" and what factors may be involved in that
determination. Like Idaho, there is no express requirement that the patient be
notified of the substitution.
B. Insulin Price Cap Laws

Another resulting variation in patient outcomes will be due to state insulin
price cap laws, a recent addition to state legislative efforts to counter escalating
costs. As of July 2020, eleven states had passed legislation capping copayments

for

23 6

237

238

insulin prescriptions

to at or under

$100/month. 240

Colorado, 24 1

Id
See Id

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.28(b) (2020).
239
1d.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.28(b2) (2020).
240

Karena Yan, Eight States Pass Legislation to Place Caps on Insulin Price; Five More

Await Ruling, THE DIATRIBE FOUNDATION (Apr. 20, 2020), https://diatribe.org/foundation/about-us/dialogue/eight-states-pass-legislation-place-caps-insulin-price-five-moreawait-ruling [https://perma.cc/9767-3FHW]; Sheryl Huggins Salmon, Minnesota Becomes

Latest U.S. State to Pass Insulin Pricing Cap,

EVERYDAY HEALTH (Apr. 20, 2020),
https://www.everydayhealth.com/type- 1-diabetes/new-mexico-becomes-third-us-state-topass-insulin-pricing-cap/ [https://perma.cc/B4YX-2UC4]; Brook Seipel, VirginiaLawmakers
Pass One of the Lowest Insulin Price Cap in Nation at $50 a Month, THE HILL,
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/486419-virginia-lawmakers-pass-lowest-insulin-pricecap-in-nation-at-50-a-month [https://perma.cc/PY87-4885];
Press Release, American

Diabetes Association, Co-Pays For Insulin and Diabetes Medication Capped at $25 in Connecticut (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.diabetes.org/newsroom/press-releases/2020/co-pays-

for-insulin-and-diabetes-medications-capped-at-25-in-CT [https://perma.cc/HT3W-Z658].
241 COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-151(2) (2020).
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245
New Mexico, 246 New
Maine,2 44 Minnesota,

249

Washington, 250 and West Virginia 25 1 all have pol-

25 2
Kentucky,
icies capping prices, while Florida,

253

and Tennessee2 54 have intro-

duced legislation to do the same. Many of these states not only elected to place
a cap on cost-sharing for insulin, but also extended the coverage to other necessities for patients with diabetes, such as glucose monitors and test strips. Additionally, a few have directed that studies be conducted on the effect of the legislation on prescription drug pricing. Figure 5, below, provides a short summary

of the state legislation.
Figure 5: Insulin Price Caps by State
Applicability
Prescription limits
State

CO 215

$100 for a 30-day
supply and $300 for
a 90-day supply
(per prescription)

All carriers marketing and issuing health coverage plans with

Enforcement
& Penalties

Effective

- Civil penalties

Apr. 15,
2020

- cease and desist orders

insulin coverage
and

242 Act Concerning Diabetes and High Deductible Health Plans, Pub. Act 20-4, 2020 Conn.

Acts 32 [Spec. Sess] (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-492d (2022)).
243 Pricing Prescription Insulin Act, Pub. Act 101-0625, 2019 Ill. Legis. Serv. 6. (West)
(codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375 / 6.11 (2020)).
244
Act of Mar. 18, 2020, ch. 666, 2020 Me. Laws 1812 (codified at ME. STAT. tit. 24-9 §
4317-C (2020)).
241 Alec Smith Insulin Affordability Act, ch. 73, sec. 4, 2020 Minn. Sess. Laws Serv. 4
(West) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 151.74 (2020)).
246
Act of Mar. 4, 2020, ch. 36, 2020 N.M. Legis. Serv. 36 (West) (to be codified at N. M.
STAT. §59A-22-41 (2020)).
247 Act of Jan. 22, 2020, ch. 56, 2020 N.Y. Laws 34 (to be codified at N.Y. INS. Law § 3216
(McKinney 2021)).
248 Insulin Access Act, ch. 67, 2020 Utah Laws 310 (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN. §
31A-22-626 (LexisNexis 2021)).
249 Act of Apr. 8, 2020, ch. 881, 2020 Va. Legis. Serv. 1 (West) (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3407.15:5 (2020)).
250
Act of Mar. 31, 2020, ch. 245, 2020 Wash. Sess. Laws 1774 (to be codified at WASH.
REv. CODE § 48.43.0003 (2021)).
251 Act of Mar. 7, 2020, ch. 2020, W. Va. Acts 2 (codified as W. VA. CODE § 5-16-7g
(2020)).
252 S.B. 116, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2020).
253 H.B. 12, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2020).
2 54
S.B. 1718, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2020).
255 3 CoLO. CODE REGS. § 702-4:4-2-68 (LexisNexis 2020).
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Applicability

Enforcement
& Penalties

HSA plans (not
including catastrophic or
grandfathered)

- suspension/revocation
of license

153
Effective

IL 256

$100 for a 30-day
supply of insulin,
test strips, and oral
agents to control
blood sugar

Plans that apply
to a group or individual policy
of accident and
health insurance

Enforced by the
department of
insurance

Jan. 1,
2021

ME257

$35 cap for a 30day supply of insu-

Any plan that
provides coverage of insulin
drugs after January 1, 2021.

None specified

Jan. 1,
2021

$35 for a 30-day
supply, manufacturer programs limiting co-pays to $75
for a 30-day supply
for families making
below 400% of the
Federal Poverty
Line

Requires insulin
makers to provide emergency
insulin free of
charge

$200,000/month
for manufacturers who do not
comply

July 1,
2020

$25 cap for 30-day
supply

"Each individual
and group health
plan, certificate
of health insurance, and

Enforcement by
superintendent

Jan. 1,
2021

lin

MN 258

NM

256

59

Pricing Prescription Insulin Act, Pub. Act 101-0625, 2019 Ill. Legis. Serv. 6. (West)

(codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375 / 6.11 (2020)).

H. P. 1493, 129 Leg., 2 nd Reg. Sess. (Me. 2020), 2020 Me. Laws 1812 (codified at ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-a § 4317-C (West 2020)).
258 Alec Smith Insulin Affordability Act, ch. 73, sec. 4, 2020 Minn. Sess. Laws Serv.
4
(West) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 151.74 (2020)).
259 Prescription Drug Cost Sharing Act, ch. 36, 2020 N.M. Legis. Serv. 1 (West) (to be
codified at N. M. STAT. ANN. §59A-22-41 (2021)).
257
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Enforcement
& Penalties

Effective

State-regulated
commercial
plans

Enforcement by
superintendent

Jan. 1,
2021

None specified

Jan. 1,

Applicability

managed health
care plan."
Ny 260

$100 cap for 30-day
supply

UT 26 1

$30 per prescription

State-regulated

of a 30-day supply

health and acci-

2021

dent plans
WA 262

$100 cap for 30-day
supply

All health benefit plans that
cover insulin,
and other necessary devices

None specified

Jan. 1,
2021

WV 2 63

$100 cap for 30-day
supply

Policy, plan, or
contract issued
or renewed on
or after July 1,

None specified

Jan. 1,
2021

2020

Colorado's statute requires carriers to limit copayments for prescription insu2 64
lin drugs to $100 for a 30-day supply and $300 for a 90-day supply. Effective
April 1, 2020, this regulation applies to: "all carriers marketing and issuing
health coverage plans that provide coverage for prescription insulin drugs in the

State of Colorado issued or renewed on or after January 1, 2020"; and to Health
Saving Account-qualified (HSA-qualified) high deductible health plans, not

Act of Jan. 22, 2020, ch. 56, 2020 N.Y. Laws 34 (codified at N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216
(McKinney 2021)).
261 Insulin Access Act, ch. 67, 2020 Utah Laws 310 (codified at UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A22-626 (LexisNexis 2021)).
262 Act of Mar. 31, 2020, ch. 245, 2020 Wash. Sess. Laws 1774 (to be codified at WASH.
REV. CODE § 48.43.0003 (2021)).
263 Act of Mar. 7, 2020, ch. 2020, W. Va. Acts 2 (codified as W. VA. CODE § 5-16-7g
(2020)).
264
COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-4:4-2-68 (2020) (allowing insurers to charge $100 per pre260

scription, not per month).
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including catastrophic plans or grandfathered health benefit plans. 265 The statute
also identifies enforcement mechanisms, including civil penalties, cease and desist orders, and suspension or revocation of license. 266
The Minnesota statute, the Alec Smith Insulin Affordability Act, is significantly more specific. The bill sets an eligibility standard for patients requiring
that individuals are not enrolled in medical assistance or in prescription drug
coverage that limits the total amount of cost sharing that the enrollee is required
to pay for a 30-day supply to $75 dollars or less. 267 The bill caps insulin copay-

ments for eligible patients at $35 for a 30-day supply. 26 8 The law also places
restrictions on manufacturers, requiring manufacturers to make their patient assistance programs available to any individual who has a family income of less
than 400% of the federal poverty guidelines and is not enrolled in prescription
drug coverage that limits insulin copayments to $75 or less. 269 There is a
$200,000 penalty on manufacturers making over $2 million in profits for non-

compliance. 270 This bill, which went into effect on July 1, 2020, is currently the
subject of a lawsuit filed by PhRMA. 271 Manufacturers allege that the law allows
the state to "commandeer private property for its public policy goals" without
just compensation. 272

The remaining eight laws effective January 1, 2021 share similar features, as
noted in Figure 5. The Illinois statute requires an insurer that provides coverage

for prescription insulin to limit the total amount that an insured is required to
pay for a 30-day supply of covered prescription insulin drugs, test strips, and

oral agents to control blood at an amount not to exceed $100, regardless of the
quantity or type of covered prescription insulin drug used to fill the insured's
prescription.2 73 Plans that apply to a group or individual policy of accident and
health insurance amended, delivered, issued, or renewed on or after January
2021 must adhere to this act.2 74 The law also requires states to monitor and create
a report of findings to gauge what works and what does not. 275

26 5

26 6

1d.

Id.

26 7

Alec Smith Insulin Affordability Act, ch. 73, sec. 4, 2020 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 3
(West) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 151.74 (2020)).
26
8

26 9

27 0

Id.
Id
1d.

271 Alicia Ault, Big Pharma Sues to Block Minnesota Insulin Affordability Law, RXLIST
(July
3,
2020),
https://www.rxlist.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=239205

[https://perma.cc/7PKH-K7D2].
272

Id.

Pricing Prescription Insulin Act, Pub. Act 101-0625, 2019 Ill. Legis. Serv. 6. (West)
(codified at 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 375 / 6.11 (2020)).
273

2741d.
27 5

1d

B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L.

156

[Vol. 27:118

Maine's law bars carriers that provide coverage for prescription insulin drugs
from imposing any deductible, copayment, coinsurance or other cost-sharing requirement on an enrollee that results in an out-of-pocket cost to the enrollee that
exceeds $35 per prescription for a 30-day supply of covered prescription insulin
drugs, regardless of the amount of insulin needed to fill the enrollee's insulin
prescriptions. 276 The enacted statute was deemed effective on March 31, 2020
and covers all policies, contracts and certificates executed, delivered, issued for
delivery, continued or renewed in this State on or after January 1, 2021.277
The New Mexico statute requires each individual and group health plan, cer-

tificate of health insurance, and managed health care plan in the state of Mexico
to provide coverage for individuals with insulin and non-insulin-using diabetes
278
The
and patients with elevated blood glucose levels induced by pregnancy.
prea
for
to
pay
required
is
diabetes
with
individual
an
amount
the
caps
statute
ferred formulary prescription insulin drug or a medically necessary alternative
at $25 for a thirty-day supply.279 The scope of the coverage, like that in Maine,
extends beyond insulin to other equipment like blood glucose test strips for mon-

280
itors, injection aids, and even oral agents for controlling blood sugar levels.
In addition, the statute lists basic health benefits that the patient covered by a
28 1
These include group health
qualifying insurance plan is required to receive.
the Health Care Purunder
renewed
plans
and
self-insurance,
of
forms
plans,
282
convene an advisory
to
superintendent
the
requires
also
Act
The
chasing Act.
on the benefits and
update
an
entailing
report
a
of
creation
the
for
committee
to be subresidents
Mexico
New
for
provisions
cost-sharing
of
costs
potential
283
legislature.
the
to
mitted

The New York law tackles caps cost-sharing for prescription insulin at $100

for a 30-day period 284 and applies cap regardless of the amount of insulin neces285
The statute also allows the Superintendent of Insary to fill the prescription.
drug price increases of more than 50%
prescription
certain
surance to investigate
increase greater than $5 per unit and
an
in
results
that
period
over a 12-month

276 Act of Mar. 18, 2020, ch. 666, 2020 Me. Laws 1812 (to be codified at ME. STAT. tit. 24A, § 4317-C (2021)).
2?? Id.

278 Prescription Drug Cost Sharing Act, ch. 36, 2020 N.M. Legis. Serv.

1 (West)

(to be

codified at N.M. STAT. § 59A-22-41 (2020)).
279

280

Id.

Id.

281 Id.

Id.
Id.
284
Act of Apr. 3, 2020, ch. 56, 2020 N.Y. Laws 343 (to be codified at N.Y. INS. LAW §
3216 (McKinney 2021)).
282

283

285

Id.
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communicate the results to the newly created drug accountability board. 286 This
board, like the advisory committee in New Mexico, will evaluate and report to
the Superintendent on a drug's impact on premium costs, affordability, and price
compared to therapeutic benefit.2 87 This statute amended the insurance law, and
thus covers state-regulated commercial plans. 288
Utah's law provides incentives for health benefit plans to reduce insulin copays by directing the Public Employees' Benefit and Insurance Program to pur-

chase insulin at discounted prices and to create a program that allows individuals
covered under a Utah health plan to purchase the discounted insulin. 289 Additionally, the statute caps the co-pays for insulin at $30 per prescription. 290 The

statute also specifies that the cap is to be in effect regardless of whether the insured has met the deductible - a notable difference from other plans.2 91 Like
other states, Utah also provides coverage for diabetes self-management and
commissions the Insurance Department to conduct a study on insulin pricing.2 92
The scope of this program does not expressly require cost-sharing other than a

co-payment of an insured before the plan will cover insulin at the lowest tier,
and also excludes state-sponsored plans.2 93
The Washington law caps the total amount that an enrollee is required to pay
for a covered insulin drug at an amount not to exceed $100 per thirty-day supply
of the drug. 294 This subsection of the bill covers all health benefit plans that
cover insulin, and other necessary devices. 295 The statute commissions a work
group to discern strategies to reduce the cost of and total expenditures on insulin
for patients, health carriers, payers, and the state before the statute goes into
effect. 296 The West Virginia law caps the total amount that an insurer can require
a covered patient with diabetes to pay for a 30-day supply of insulin at $100,

regardless of the quantity or type of insulin needed to fill the person's needs. 297

28

61d.
28? Id.
28 8

Id

289

Insulin Access Act, ch. 67, 2020 Utah Laws 310 (to be codified at UTAH CODE ANN.
§

49-20-420 (LexisNexis 2020)).
290

Id
Id.
29 2
Id
293 Id
291

294 Act of Mar. 31, 2020, ch. 245, 2020 Wash. Sess. Laws 1774 (to be codified at WASH.
REv. CODE § 48.43.0003 (2021)).
295
Act of Mar. 31, 2020, ch. 245, 2020 Wash. Laws 1775 (to be codified at WAsH. REv.
CODE § 48.20.391 (2021)).
296
Act of Mar. 31, 2020, ch. 346, 2020 Wash. Laws 2609 (to be codified at WASH. REv.
CODE § 70.14.002 (2021)).
2 97
Act of Mar. 7, 2020, ch. 2020, W. Va. Acts 2 (codified as W. VA. CODE § 5-16-7g
(2020)).
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The law also prohibits a manufacturer, wholesaler, or PBM from passing on the
298
costs of prescribed insulin to the pharmacist or pharmacy. This law only specifies that a policy, plan, or contract that is issued or renewed on or after July 1,
2020 must provide coverage for prescription insulin drugs, however, does not
299
Finally,
specify specifically what health plans will be governed by the law.
the Virginia legislation simply limits costs sharing for Virginians to $50 for a
300
30-day supply for patients with state-regulated commercial insurance.

IV.

FRAMING LIABILITY: STATE TORT LAW AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Drugs, biologics, and medical devices raise confounding liability issues for
several reasons, the most obvious one being that most of these products may not
30 1
Congress has given the FDA the
be sold without prior government approval.
of new drugs and biologics, or
benefits
the
against
risks
the
weigh
to
authority
for the market. 302 This raises
them
approving
before
devices,
of
types
certain
of
the question of when, if ever, a manufacturer should be liable for harms caused
by properly manufactured FDA-approved products. Another characteristic of
drugs and biologics is that they can be inherently dangerous, even when properly
used, but they can also provide significant, even lifesaving, medical benefits.
Several core questions have framed the case law in the realm of state tort
liability for harm caused by drugs, biologics, and medical devices. Should a drug
manufacturer be liable at all for harm from a product approved by the FDA if
the potential harm was identified on the FDA's approved labeling? What if the

physician did not advise the patient of the potential risk during the informational
counseling process? What if the harm to the patient is one that was not discovered during a clinical trial because it arose only after several years of product
use? What if the company failed to analyze its post-market adverse events reports and as a result did not realize the drug was causing problems after longterm usage?

All three product areas (drug, biologic, device) are implicated with insulin, as
it is being transitioned from a drug to a biologic, and products will often be
"combination products" under FDA regulations including a medical device de-

livery component. 303 The Supreme Court has squarely addressed federal
preemption in the context of both drugs and medical devices, though not
29 8
29 9

1d.
Id.

"0 Act of Apr. 8, 2020, ch. 881, 2020 Va. Legis. Serv. 1 (West) (codified at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 38.2-3407.15:5 (2020)); see also Alex Day, Virginia Caps Insulin Co-Pays at $50for Vir24,
(Apr.
Ass'N
DIABETES
AM.
Diabetes,
with
ginians
https://www.diabetes.org/newsroom/press-releases/2020/insulin-co-pays-virginia

[https://perma.cc/AX2H-MVNY].
301 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
302 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
303 21 U.S.C. § 353(g)

2020),
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biologics. There is lower court variation on both the question of federal preemp-

tion for biologics and how the preemption analysis is undertaken when dealing
with a combination product (e.g., a drug-device, drug-biologic, biologic-device,
or all three). Also unclear is what the transition from drug to biologic status
means for preemption purposes.

Products liability claims against manufacturers of FDA-regulated products
can be divided into three general categories: claims alleging that a product was
produced with a manufacturing defect, claims alleging that the product was defectively designed, and claims alleging that the product was accompanied by
inadequate warnings. Manufacturing defect claims are possible when a specific
product comes out of the factory with an unintended flaw-for example, pills
that were inadvertently mixed with poisonous adulterants. In these cases, the
manufacturer will be strictly liable for any resulting injuries, regardless of how
much care it took to ensure the product's safety. 304
Design defect claims challenge the way the manufacturer chose to develop
the entire product line. In general, products can be considered defectively designed when an alternative, cost-effective design exists that would have prevented the injury. However, design defect claims involving drugs and biologics
are rarely successful. Some courts have ruled that design defect liability is never
appropriate because these products are "unavoidably unsafe"; in other words,
that there is simply no way to make them safer without compromising their utility. The Third Restatement of Torts recognizes only one circumstance in which
design defect liability would be appropriate for drugs: when "reasonable
healthcare providers, knowing of [the product's] foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients." 305 It is hard to imagine this standard being satisfied for any drug or biologic that has received FDA approval. Even drugs with serious safety warnings,
such as the diabetes drug Avandia, continue to be prescribed for limited groups
of patients who have not benefited from alternative treatments. 306
The final theory of liability, inadequate warnings or failure to warn, accounts
for most products' liability cases against drug, biologic, and medical device
manufacturers. In an inadequate warning claim, the plaintiff alleges that her injuries were due to a risk in the product that the manufacturer should have disclosed in its labeling. The assumption behind these claims is that if the risk had
been disclosed, the plaintiff would have decided not to take the drug or use the
device, thereby avoiding the injury. Most courts agree that the manufacturer will

304 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 2(A)

(CMT. A) (AM. L. INST.

1998).
30

s Id.
306 See Lisa Rappaport, HeartRisks from Diabetes DrugAvandia Confirmed in
New Study,
EVERYDAY HEALTH (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.everydayhealth.com/type-2-diabetes/heartrisks-from-diabetes-drug-avandia-confirmed-in-new-study/
[https://perma.cc/AHJ8MDZG].
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not be liable for failure to warn of unknowable risks or failing to anticipate scientific advances. Manufacturers do have a duty to track new scientific developments or new information about risks attendant to the use of their products, and
to so advise prescribers. 307 The developing ability of manufacturers to mine
medical records for post-market information about products will likely greatly
affect this duty, and manufacturers' ability to fulfill it. While manufacturers are
not required by tort law to advise prescribers of risks compared to other products,
this may change if comparative effectiveness gains traction in the United States.
Manufacturers may not actively market their products for any uses other than
those listed on the FDA-approved labeling, but physicians are free to prescribe
3 08
them for non-approved purposes, a practice known as "off-label" prescribing.
In some cases, off-label uses may represent the standard of care and may be
309
Courts are
reimbursed by both governmental and private third-party payers.
respect
with
warn
to
duty
a
have
manufacturers
whether
of
split on the question
3 10
is most
warn
to
failure
for
Liability
uses.
off-label
common
to the risks of
use. 311
off-label
the
about
knew
or
encouraged
manufacturer
likely where the
Promotional activities can undermine an otherwise adequate warning if they
downplay risks, over-emphasize benefits, or otherwise encourage physicians to

312
discount risks discussed in product warnings. This can also occur when a com-

pany representative is present during the physician's conversation with a pa-

tient. 313 Case law regarding off-label promotion practices and the authority of
3 14
with the FDA increasingly entering into
the FDA to prohibit them is in flux,
315
than proceeding through litigation.
rather
industry
with
settlement agreements

307 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4).
308 CONG. RSCH. SERv., R45792, OFF-LABEL USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, 2(2019).
309

Id. at 11.

310 James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off-Label or Out of Bounds? Prescriberand Marketer

Liabilityfor Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12
315-316 (2003).
311

ANNALS HEALTH L. 295,

300,

Id

312 d.
313

Id.

See United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 168-169 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v.
Vascular Solutions, Inc. 181 F. Supp. 3d 342, 346 (W.D. Tex. 2016).
31
1 See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y.
2015); Press Release, Department of Justice, Par Pharm. Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $45
314

Million (March 5, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/par-pharmaceuticals-pleads-guilty-

and-agrees-pay-45-million-resolve-civil-and-criminal

[https://perma.cc/775W-7PWP].

The

Par settlement and corporate integrity agreement, dated March 5, 2013, involved $22.5 mil-

lion (civil) and $22.5 million (criminal) fines. Id. See also Press Release, Pacira Biosciences,
Inc., Pacira Pharm. Announces Favorable Resolution (Dec. 15, 2015), https://investor.pacira.com/news-releases/news-release-details/pacira-pharmaceuticals-announces-favor-

able-resolution-us-food [https://perma.cc/8K4K-8UW5]. The Pacira settlement involved a
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A. MedicalDevices

An exhaustive analysis of the case law regarding the application of federal
preemption concepts in the drug and medical device context is unnecessary here.
Countless scholars have explored the matrix of Supreme Court decisions that
frame the bounds of preemption. It is a complex web of express and implied
preemption and the role of FDA regulations. This section provides a summative

discussion of the relevant cases in order to explore the challenges in the biologic
realm.
For medical devices, Congress included an express preemption provision in
the Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA, providing that a state cannot

have a law regarding medical devices:
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this chapter. 316
Because so many states had laws that applied to the safety of medical devices
at the time of enactment of the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the federal
FDCA, Congress wanted to ensure that federal law prevailed over these state
laws. Two Supreme Court cases establish that medical devices that undergo extensive FDA review and approval via the premarket approval (PMA) process
involving rigorous clinical trials are subject to federal preemption of state tort
laws; on the other hand, medical devices that enter the market through FDA's
"clearance" process based on substantial equivalence (a comparative assessment) rather than approval are not subject to federal preemption of state tort
liability. 317
The foundation 1996 Supreme Court case of Medtronic v. Lohr held that the
statute did not preempt state law where the device at issue entered the market
through the 510(k) clearance process, which simply determines whether the device is substantially equivalent to one already on the market.3 18 The Court
grounded this decision in the statutory language, in that the 510(k) process does
not "relate[]" to "the safety or effectiveness" of a medical device because it relates specifically to substantial equivalence rather than the safety and efficacy as

rare FDA "recession letter" dated December 15, 2015 to rescind language contained within
an issued Warning Letter from the agency. Id.
316

Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 521, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2014).
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, (2008); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
(1996).
318
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). The "510(k)" refers to the section of the
317

Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act that sets forth the clearance process, requiring certain manufacturers to submit a premarket notification to the FDA prior to introducing their products into

the market. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §510(k), 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(k),
360(n), 360c(f)(1), 360c(i) (2014).
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measured through clinical trials.319 Twelve years later, the Court decided another
device case which involved a device that had undergone the FDA's premarket
approval (PMA) process, including an evaluation of safety and effectiveness
based on clinical trials. 320 In Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court concluded that the
32 1
The
FDCA preempted state tort law claims when a PMA device was at issue.

differences between these two cases lie in the statutory language of the express
preemption clause. Simply stated: if the device entered the market after FDA
approval through the PMA process, the express preemption clause applies because any state law relating to "requirements" of "safety or efficacy" would be
"different from" the federal requirements; if the device entered the market
through after being declared substantially equivalent to an existing product, the
express preemption clause does not apply because the clearance process does

not assess safety or efficacy or mandate product-specific requirements but only
general, standardized controls over manufacturing and labeling.
There is developing litigation in the lower courts regarding medical devices
with multiple component parts that add an additional layer to the preemption
analysis. One recent case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
322
Plaintiffs brought a variety
is instructive on this point in the insulin context.
323
The court
of claims against the manufacturer of an insulin infusion pump.

dismissed many of the claims, but the negligence, strict liability, breach of ex324
The insulin
press warranties, and failure to warn claims survived dismissal.
infusion pump was approved as a product to continuously or intermittently ad-

minister insulin to the user based on the product's monitoring and feedback system. 325 The product consisted of a small syringe in the pump connected to the
patient via cannula; accompanying electronics and algorithms calculate the dos326
ages necessary over the course of the day. Plaintiff alleged a product malfunction left her unresponsive in a coma due to a hypoglycemic episode and resulted
327
in severe and persistent brain injury requiring constant care. The court offered
no conclusion on the issue of preemption in the process of declining to dismiss
the claims, but did note that the infusion pump had entered the market as a Class
III PMA device, thus raising the question of whether the express preemption

319

Lohr, 518 U.S. at 500.
Riegel, 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
3 21
Id. at 312.
322 Kubicki ex rel. Kubicki v. Medtronic, No. 12-00734 CKK, 2013 WL 1739580 at *9-10
(D. D.C., March 21, 2013).
3 20

32 3

1d

324 1d.
325

Id. at *1.

32

61d

327 Id.
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provision applies in this situation. 328 The opinion also emphasized that "the FDA

granted premarket approval to the entire device." 329
A 2018 Third Circuit case explored a medical device product described as a
"hybrid" implanted hip replacement system, comprised of medical device components that were assessed independently from each other by the FDA either as
a Class II cleared component or Class III PMA components. 330 When the separately reviewed and approved or cleared products were implanted together, they
made up the entirely of the patient's hip replacement system. 33 1 The court stated

"[t]he question of first impression we confront today arises at the intersection of
these different classes of devices with their different approval schemes: How do
we apply the Medical Device Amendments' express preemption provision to a

'hybrid system,' i.e., a system that is itself a 'device' but that is comprised of
Class II components in addition to one or more Class III components?" 332 There,
the court held that the malfunctioning part (the metal liner mediating the connection between the hip socket and thighbone) was to be assessed based on its
route to market, i.e. the PMA pathway. 333 Thus, the express preemption provi-

sion applied to preempt state tort liability claims. 334
On the other hand, an earlier Massachusetts district court case arose from injuries resulting from an insulin pump and continuous glucose monitoring system
manufactured by Medtronic. 335 The Plaintiffs claimed the pump was defective
and that its malfunction caused a hypoglycemic reaction resulting in injury. 336
There, the court found that because the entire product was granted FDA approval
with specific requirements regarding safety and efficacy applicable to that device, rather than individual components evaluated on differing statutory and regulatory bases, the state tort claims were preempted. 337 There was no need to focus on which component was at fault because the product had been assessed and
approved as a whole. 338 The court made this determination both on the express
preemption provision in the statute and a letter received by Medtronic from the

32 8

1d. at *8.
1d. at *5.

329

330 Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 772 (3d Cir. 2018).

33' Id. at 768.
332
d. Class II medical devices are subject to the 510(k) clearance process, while Class III
products may be subject to the premarket approval (PMA) process. Id at 764.
333

Id

34

Id. at 775.
Duggan v. Medtronic, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 466, 468 (D. Mass. 2012).

33 5
336

Id. The plaintiffs' claims included negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, unfair and deceptive
acts or practices in violation of Massachusetts law, and loss of consortium. Id
33
7
a47
331 d. at 471.
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339
In
FDA which indicated that the approval was given to the entire product.
made
had
agency
the
FDA,
the
to
plaintiff
the
by
petition
citizen's
a
to
response
it clear that the PMA was granted for the entire system, not just the pump and
monitor components. 340 In deciding the case, the District Court walked through
34
the analysis set forth in Riegel v. Medtronic. 1

B. Drugs

Congress did not include an express preemption provision in the FDCA for
drugs. The original 1906 federal law and subsequent amendments set forth robust requirements for assuring the safety and efficacy of drug products, predating the federal medical device provisions by decades. The Supreme Court has
342
instead applied implied preemption precedent, coupled with application of the
FDA's own regulations about label changes to approved drugs, to address liabil343
The FDA regulaity for failure to strengthen a label's warning in this realm.

tion provides that the holder of an approved drug can implement certain changes
following submission of a supplement to the agency, typically called a
"Changes-Being-Effected 0" or CBE-0 supplement. The "0" denotes the immediacy with which the change can be made, as there is a zero day wait for imple344
The FDA may disapprove the supplemental application
menting the change.

containing the label change and will then order the manufacturer to cease distri345
Changes amendable to
bution of the drug products that display the change.
the CBE-0 process include:
(i) Addition to a specification or changes in the methods or controls to provide increased assurance that the drug substance or drug product will have

339

Id.

340 Id

34' Id. at 469; Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
342 Implied preemption occurs in the absence of an applicable express preemption clause,
where the federal and state laws are nonetheless incompatible. There are several different

forms of implied preemption. Implied field preemption arises when the scope of a federal
statute is so broad as to indicate a Congressional intent to occupy the whole field, or exclusively regulate the subject matter at issue. Implied conflict preemption arises in a couple of
circumstances. One circumstance of conflict preemption occurs when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law. That is, they demand contradictory actions that cannot be
simultaneously achieved. The second situation of implied conflict preemption arises when

adherence to state law will disrupt policy goals underlying federal law. This form of preemption is sometimes referred to as implied obstacle preemption. See generally, CONG. RsCH.
SERV., R45825 FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER (2019).

343 21 CFR §314.70 (2019).

The FDA also has a "CBE-30" designation for changes that require 30-day lead time.
21 CFR §314.70(c)(3) (2019).
345 21 CFR §314.70(c)(7) (2019).
344
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the characteristics of identity, strength, quality, purity, or potency that it
purports or is represented to possess;

(ii) A change in the size and/or shape of a container for a nonsterile drug
product, except for solid dosage forms, without a change in the labeled
amount of drug product or from one container closure system to another;
(iii) Changes in the labeling to reflect newly acquired information, except

for changes to the information required in 201.57(a) of this chapter (which
must be made under paragraph (b)(2)(v)(C) of this section), to accomplish
any of the following:
(A) To add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction for which the evidence of a causal association satisfies the
standard for inclusion in the labeling under 201.57(c) of this chapter;
(B) To add or strengthen a statement about drug abuse, dependence, psychological effect, or overdosage;
(C) To add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration
that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product;
(D) To delete false, misleading, or unsupported indications for use or
claims for effectiveness; or
(E) Any labeling change normally requiring a supplement submission
and approval prior to distribution of the drug product that FDA specifically requests be submitted under this provision.346
The outcome of Supreme Court preemption cases for drug products is deeply

unsatisfying and problematic from a public health standpoint. Essentially, the
ability of a patient to bring a state tort claim against a drug manufacturer based
on theories of failure to warn, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and design defect turns on whether that drug entered the market as a new, innovator
drug or as a generic version based on measures of bioequivalence to the innovator drug.347 In Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court held that state failure to warn
claims were not preempted for innovator drugs, meaning that there was no implied conflict preemption, because innovator drugs approved through the new
drug approval process had the power to make changes to the product label to
strengthen a warning without FDA approval under the regulation.348 In both
PLIVA v. Mensing, involving the failure of a generic manufacturer to change its

label to reflect a new side effect, 349 and Mutual Pharmaceutical v. Bartlett, involving a design defect claim for a generic drug, the Supreme Court found implied conflict preemption existed. 350

34621 CFR §314.70(c)(6) (2019).
347 See 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
348 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 555 (2009).
3 49
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625-626 (2011).
351 Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472, 472 (2013).
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In PLIVA, specifically, the Court determined that a private party could not
comply with the state law without first obtaining the approval of a federal regulatory agency and, therefore, it was preempted. 351 The conflict was grounded in
the fact that generic drug labels are required by both federal statute and regula35 2
tions to be identical in form to the brand drug label under the statute. Thus,
the regulation as written did not apply to generic drugs. The Supreme Court expressly calls out this problem in PLIVA, and nudges either the FDA or Congress

to address it. The decision states "[flollowing [the] argument to its logical conclusion, it is also possible that, by asking, the Manufacturers could have per-

suaded the FDA to rewrite its generic drug regulations entirely or talked Con353
Subsequent to the
gress into amending the Hatch-Waxman Amendments."

354
case, several legislative bills were introduced but were never enacted.
The FDA also issued a notice of proposed rulemaking in November of 2013
355
The FDA acknowlto amend the regulation to also apply to generic drugs.
that the labelpolicy
long-standing
the
alter
would
rule
proposed
edged that the
a change
noted
but
product
drug
reference
the
to
identical
be
must
ing of generics
356
comment
The
regulation.
the
to
revision
the
necessitating
in circumstances
period closed March 13, 2014357 and the FDA has since rescinded the proposal
rule as a result of backlash from the generic drug industry and Congress.
Twenty-eight members of Congress signed a letter to the FDA, offering "grave

3"

PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 624.
35221 U. S.C. §355(j)(2)(A). The statute requires the generic drug to have labeling "the same
as the labeling approved for the listed drug." §355(j)(2)(A)(v). In addition to labeling having
to be the same, so also does the active ingredient, route of administration, dosage form, and

strength of the product. §355()(2)(A)(ii) & (iii).
353
PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 621.
3 See., e.g., Patient Safety and Generic Labeling Improvement Act, S. 2295, 112" Cong.
(2012).
355 Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013). The FDA took five years to
finally abandon the effort by withdrawing the proposed rule in December 2018. Withdrawal
of Proposed Rule on Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs and Biological Products, 83 Fed. Reg. 64299 (Dec. 14, 2018). The FDA's effort included a Regulatory Impact Analysis. FDA, SUPPLEMENTAL APPLICATIONS PROPOSING
LABELING CHANGES FOR APPROVED DRUGS AND BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS: PRELIMINARY
ADMINISTRATION,
DRUG
AND
FOOD
ANALYSIS,
IMPACT
REGULATORY

https://www.fda.gov/media/87380/download [https://perma.cc/L3PV-HZZ7].
356 Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bio-

logical Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,988-67,989 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013).
357 Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs and Bio-

logical Products: Correction and Extension of Comment Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,796 (Dec.
27, 2013).
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concerns" about the proposed regulation. 358 The letter questioned the authority
to promulgate such a rule given the statutory language and urges that it would
lead to inconsistency in drug messages to consumers and physicians alike. 359
The letter states that the proposed rule would "conflict directly with the statute,
thwart the law's purposes and objectives, and impose significant costs on the
drug industry and healthcare consumers." 360
In the most recent 2019 case of Merck Sharp & Dohme v. Albrecht, the Court
revisited language from Wyeth v. Levine and held that where there is "clear evidence" of impossibility to comport with both the federal and state requirement,
impossibility preemption exists. Specifically, there must be clear evidence that
the FDA would not have approved a change to a label. 361 The case defines clear
evidence as evidence showing that the manufacture fully informed the FDA of
the justifications for the warning required by state law and the FDA informed
them that they would not approve the changes to include that warning. The Court
also determined the issue as one for a judge, not a jury, to decide. 362 The Court
remanded the issue to the Court of Appeals to determine whether there was clear
evidence in the case. 363

C. Biologics
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed biologic preemption as a general
matter. As with drugs, Congress did not provide an express preemption provision for biologics within the Public Health Service Act3 64 or the precursor Biologics Control Act of 1902.365 Given harmonization in the regulatory processes

for drugs and biologics, many of the regulations applicable to drugs are also
applicable to biologics, either through express statement in the regulations, by
statute, or through FDA policy expressed in guidance documents or other

3

Kurt R. Karst, Lawmakers Express "Grave Concerns" with Generic Drug Labeling
Proposal; Demand Answers from FDA, FDA LAw BLOG (January 22, 2014),
https://www.fdalawbog.net/2014/01/lawmakers-express-grave-concerns-with-generic-drug-

labeling-proposal-demand-answers-from-fda/ [https://perma.cc/G4M2-LW92].
35 9
Id.
36 0

Id

361

Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S.Ct. 1668, 1668 (2019). The Wyeth

decision stated that "absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change
to Phenergan's label, we will not conclude that it as impossible for Wyeth to comply with

both federal and state requirements." Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, at 571 (2009).
36 2
Albrecht, 139 S.Ct at 1672.
363

Id. at 1680-1681. Subsequent lower court cases are now wrestling with this task
now,
with the fullness of the FDA record as one issue. See, e.g., In re Zofran (Ondansetron) Prods.

Liab. Litig., 368 F. Supp. 3d 94, 95 (D. Mass. 2019).
36 4
Pub. L. No. 78-410, §351(a), 58 Stat. 702 (1944).
365 Pub. L. No. 57-244 ch. 1378, 32 Stat.728 (1902).
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informal means. 366 For example, allowing enhancement of drug label warnings
without affirmative FDA approval of the changes in advance of the change's
implementation is one process that applies to both biologics approved via BLA

and drugs approved via NDA. 367 A biologic-specific provision in the regulations, 21 C.F.R. §601.12, addresses changes to an approved BLA label; the lan36 8
guage is nearly identical to the regulations pertaining to NDA drugs.

Several state courts have issued decisions addressing the question of whether
and how biologic preemption analysis differs from drug and device preemption.
The case In re Genentech, Inc., Herceptin (Trastuzumab) Marketing & Sales
PracticesLitigation arose from a claim, based in California state tort law, alleging that Herceptin, a biologic drug (approved via the BLA process) used to treat

breast cancer, was not sold in vials that contained 440 or more mg/mL of the
drug. 369 The plaintiffs alleged that this was a breach of expressed and implied
370
The BLA for
warranties and unjust enrichment under California state law.
Herceptin was approved for a range of 440±35 mg/mL per vial, which meant

that the FDA had determined that the manufacturing process used in production
of the drug was safe so long as the concentration of the vial was within that
specific range. 37 1 In order to comply with California state law, Genentech would
have had to alter the manufacturing or labeling procedures for Herceptin. Because an approved BLA must be in conformance with federal law both for its
labeling and manufacturing procedures, this change would have required that
372
Herceptin go through an FDA approval process again.
The court applied PLIVA, determining that, while the product that was being
approved and the congressional statute outlining its approval mechanism may

have been different, the same concept applied: a state law could be preempted
by implied preemption if it served as an obstacle to the execution of an agency's
congressionally-specified goal. 373 In this case, California state law was
preempted because the FDA acknowledges that reasonable variation between
the product and its label must be tolerated, and Genentech's compliance with the
374
Thus, the Plaintiff's
state law claims would conflict with that FDA principle.

366

See Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative
History of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act 2009, 65 FooD & DRUG L.J.

671, 687 (2010).
36721 C.F.R. §601.12(f)(2)(i) (2019) (applying the general NDA drug labeling requirements to BLA biologics).
368 Compare 21 C.F.R. §601.12(f)(2)(i) (2019) with 21 CFR §314.70(c)(6)(iii)(2019).
3 69

In re Genentech, Inc., Herceptin (Trastuzumab) Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 367 F.

Supp. 3d 1274, 1277 (N.D. Okla. 2019).
370

Id.

37 1
372

373
374

Id.at 1278-79.
Id. at 1278, 1288-89.
Id. at 1282.
1d at 1284-86, 1288.
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state-law claims conflict with federal legislation and were deemed preempted as
they were in PLIVA. 375
The issue of federal preemption of state unfair competition law in the biologic
context was addressed by the Supreme Court in Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., a
case relating to the complex patent information exchange and disclosure processes in the BPCIA rather than the invocation of state tort liability for harm to
a consumer. 376 The preemption issue was remanded back to the Federal District
Court, which held that the BPCIA preempts state law remedies under both conflict preemption and field preemption theories. 377 The court pointed out that requiring biosimilar applicants to comply with the BPCIA's "detailed regulatory
regime" in addition to 50, potentially different, state-law regimes would place
an unreasonable burden that Congress did not intend to impose with the passage
of the BPCIA.378
Despite the sense that courts are treating biologic preemption relating to in-

novator biologics as they do preemption relating to innovator drugs, there is a
lack of clarity about preemption's application to biosimilar or interchangeable
biologic products. Largely because of the relative recency of the BPCIA, introducing two abbreviated routes to market for biologic products, the legal scholarship lacks a focused assessment of any existing case law. The BPCIA requires
biosimilars to be "highly similar" to the innovator biologic, rather than bioequivalent, and the statute does not require the label to be "the same as" or identical
to the innovator, as generic drugs must be in order to enter the market. 379 Arguably, this suggests that there is thus no conflict or obstacle preemption issue

within the biosimilar or interchangeable realm and that biosimilar and interchangeable products will not benefit from the protection of implied preemption,
at least with respect to challenges relating to the product's label. In addition, the
FDA guidance regarding labeling of biosimilar products states that

[w]hen new information becomes available that causes information in labeling to be inaccurate, the application holder must take steps to change
the content of its product labeling, in accordance with 21 C.F.R. 601.12.
All holders of marketing applications for biological products have an ongoing obligation to ensure their labeling is accurate and up to date. 380
The referenced section 601.12 mimics the CBE-0 drug regulation in the sense
that it provides for addition without prior approval by the FDA of heightened

375

Id. at 1289-90.

Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1664, 1669 (2017).
Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 877 F.3d 1315, 1320, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
378
1dat 1329.
379 42 U.S.C §262(k)(2)(A)(i).
376

3 77

380

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., LABELING FOR BIOsIMILAR PRODUCTS: GUIDANCE FOR

INDUSTRY (2018), https://www.fda.gov/media/96894/download [https://perma.cc/NMV29ZX4].
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warnings on the label. 381 The guidance linking these requirements is worded as
applicable to all biologic products, which includes biosimilars and interchangeable biologics. Future litigation will undoubtedly test this language, as well as
the ability of the FDA to issue such a directive with significant implications for
legal liability through guidance document.
D. CombinationProducts

Where a product is a combination of two or three of drug, biologic and medical device, the preemption analysis could turn on how the product or component
that caused the harm got to market. As Professor George Horvath notes, combination products have two identities: their identity imparted by their statutory
definition as a combination product and their regulatory identity which leads
382
them to be reviewed as either a drug, device, or biological product. Combination products also have multiple mechanisms of action and their regulatory identity is chosen based on the primary mode of action, defined as the one that con383
tributes the most significant therapeutic effect. A chemical primary mode of
384
a mechanical or physical mode of action
action will be regulated as a drug,
will be regulated as a medical device, and a biological mode of action will be
regulated as a biologic. 385 With a faulty combination product, it is often straightforward to determine which component of that product caused the harm, though
sometimes it is not. For example, the insulin pen Lantus (a recombinant insulin
glargine), which is a combination biologic-medical device, is a biologic by regulatory identity. The approval of Lantus was through the drug approval process,

but the product has now been deemed a biologic by the FDA. 386 The biologic
mode of action (as a therapeutic to treat diabetes) is distinct from its device mode
of action (delivering the biologic into the body); however, the two modes of
action are combined into a single product. While the FDA can incorporate basic
38121

C.F.R. §601.12(f)(2) (2011).

382 George Horvath, Emergent Regulatory Systems and Their Challenges: The Case of
CombinationMedical Products, 94 WASH. L. REv. 1697, 1749 (2019).

38321

C.F.R. §3.2(k), (m) (2019).

384FDA,

GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM

"CHEMICAL ACTION" IN THE DEFINITION OF DEVICE UNDER SECTION 201(H) OF THE FEDERAL

FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2011), http://www.fdalawblog.net/wp-content/uploads/ar-

chives/docs/ChemicalAction%20Guidance.pdf

[https://perma.cc/U6XX-EPM6]

(FDA de-

fines a chemical mode of action as one that "[t]hrough either chemical reaction or intermolecular forces or both, the product: (1) Mediates a bodily response at the cellular or molecular
level, or (2) combines with or modifies an entity so as to alter that entity's interaction with

the body of man or other animals."). Id.
38521 C.F.R. §3.4(a) (2019).
3 86
Lantus Approval Information, DRUGS@FDA: FDA-APPROVED DRUGS, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/daf/index.cfm?event=overview.process&ApplNo-021081

[https://perma.cc/86F2-XERE] (last visited Sep. 24, 2020) ("This Former NDA Was Deemed
To Be a BLA on March 23, 2020.").
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safeguards for development of the medical device aspects of the product, the
overall product entered the market through the drug (and later transitioned to
biologic) approval process.

The Supreme Court has not addressed combination product preemption and
the state of the case law in the lower courts is inconsistent. For example, the
New Jersey case of R.F. v. Abbott Laboratoriesinvolved an HIV blood screen-

ing test classified as a combination product - both a biologic and a medical device. 387 The product's development, manufacture and field testing was overseen
by the Office of Biologics and Research and Review (OBRR) and largely regulated by as a biologic; however, the OBRR required that the test be listed as a
medical device and its package insert drafted pursuant to the regulations for labeling medical devices. 388 The FDA was closely involved in determining the
labeling and post-marketing considerations of the product as well. 389 The plain-

tiff was infected with HIV following a blood transfusion for which the donor
tested negative using the HIV test in question. 390 Plaintiffs argued that Abbott
was aware that the product was producing false-negative results and was required under New Jersey law to warn of the incidence and the inherent dangerousness of borderline samples in a supplemental package insert or instruct blood
banks to retest such borderline samples. 391
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the FDA's exercise of control
and initiative over the product's "development, packaging, and field performance monitoring" along with "the unique circumstances under which the Test
arose (a national health crisis. . .)," give rise to implied obstacle preemption. 392
The court reasoned that the FDA was responsible for meeting the goals set out
by Congress, and it was the agency's determination that calling for repeated tests
in the event of borderline-negative results would not be worth the risk of diminishing the nation's blood supply. 393 In a fact-specific determination largely in-

dependent from any analysis of the scope of the FDA's product approval pathway, the Court decided that it was best not to second-guess the FDA's methods
in achieving its express goals. 394

Overall, there is jurisdictional inconsistency about whether a combination
product preemption analysis should focus on the regulatory identity (how it got
to market) or the specific mode of action or component part that allegedly caused

381 R.F. v. Abbott Lab'ys., 745 A.2d 1174, 1178 (2000).
388
Id
389
Id at 1180-83.
39 0
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3 93
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the harm. 395 This inconsistency and uncertainty as to preemption outcome adds
to the challenges that will face litigants regarding biosimilar and interchangeable
insulin products because many products that are utilized by patients as an insulin

system are approved or cleared as separate or integrated products. And, as insulin is moved from drug status to biologic status, it is unclear what the present
"deemed biologic" status as transitioned from the original new drug approval
pathway as an NDA, 505(b)(2), or ANDA (generic) drug will mean for what
case law to apply.
V. PROTECTING PATIENTS AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH

The legal and regulatory landscape for insulin is complex; its currently a mix

of state law directives and procedures as positioned against uncertain federal
preemption law. There is a certain futility in attempting to identify nearly limitless outcomes for patients depending on the patchwork of state and federal statutory and common law. However, moving forward as the U.S. anticipates that
interchangeable insulin products will inevitably enter the market, there are several broad issues to be addressed that can serve to infuse uniformity and predictability into the process for patients and prescribers. The purpose of this article is
to present the range of complex legal questions facing interchangeable insulins

and the patients that will use them. This Part suggests five modest means to
begin to address the legal uncertainties and the level of understandings of prescribers, patients, and the general public.
A. Raise Awareness about Biologics

There is a foundational need to educate prescribers and patients about the scientific and regulatory distinctions between traditional chemical drugs and complex biological products. This can be addressed through various means, including broad public awareness campaigns, professional training requirements, and
continuing medical education content and venues. At the state level, in addition
to prescriber-pharmacist communication requirements, states should implement
provisions that require pharmacists to inform and educate patients as well. Supplementing patient consent requirements with required education requirements
may help quell patient confusion but may work against the goals of introducing
biosimilars into the market by highlighting the differences in products rather
than the similarities. Ultimately, while states with stricter automatic substitution
requirements regarding informational exchange may discourage use of biosimilar insulins, stringent post-market requirements allow for more robust surveillance of such therapies to feed into the regulatory process.
There may also be a role for the FDA's utilization of risk evaluation and mitigation strategies (REMS) authorized by statute. The Food and Drug

395

See generally, Horvath, supra note 382 (providing a careful assessment of the scope of

this case law).
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Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA) introduced REMS as a
means to enhance the post-approval authority over drugs and biologics by the
FDA. 396 The scope and format of REMS include enhanced communications to
prescribers, patient medication guides targeted to more general information presented in comprehensible language, and mechanisms to ensure product vigilance
and reporting.397 The FDA can require REMS as either a condition of approval39 8

or, in the case of already approved products, as a subsequent condition for continued marketing.399 REMS may require a medication guide for patients; physi-

cian prescribing information; communications to health care providers and pharmacies; limitations on labeling, promotion, and prescribing in order to assure
safe use by patients; and a plan for implementation. 400 FDAAA also contains

related post-market provisions that allow the FDA to require further studies for
safety and efficacy of an approved product, along with increased authority for
the FDA to review these commitments on a continuing basis. 40 1 Violations sub-

ject manufacturers to litigation under misbranding provisions and trigger civil
money penalties. 402 The FDA currently requires 60 active REMS for drugs and
biologics, the majority of which include elements to assure safe use (ETASU)
that take the form of distribution restrictions, training and recordkeeping requirements for prescribers and pharmacists, and prescribing limitations. 403
As the FDA works to transition insulin from drug products to biologics, and
eventually approves an interchangeable product, REMS could be implemented
for individual products or as a shared system of requirements in the post-market
realm. The REMS could address aspects of prescriber and patient understandings about interchangeable products (as compared to generic drugs), the basics
of the operation of interchangeable biologic substitution laws (as opposed to generic drug substitution laws), and the importance of diligence in tracking patient
prescriptions and related adverse outcomes. The FDA may resist a role in conveying legal information about state laws, yet the newness of the interchangeable pathway to market and the connection between the product status assigned
by the FDA and triggering of state-by-state variation in substitution mechanisms
bears consideration of taking on that role.

396

Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat.
823 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
3 97

14

Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 505-1(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1).
§ 505-1(a)(2), 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(2).
§ 505-1(c)-(f), 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(c)-(f).
401 Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) §§ 505(p), 505-1, 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(p),
355-1(g)(2).
402 Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 502(y), 21
U.S.C. § 352(y).
403
398

399 Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA)
4 Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act (FDCA)

See FDA, Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), http://www.ac-

cessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/index.cfin

[https://perma.cc/ZZ57-B9UQ].

B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.

174

[Vol. 27:118

B. Adopt Uniform InterchangeableSubstitution Laws

Prior literature traces the development of state initiatives supporting the drafting and enactment of interchangeable biologic substitution laws. Some state
laws were enacted as the result of early intensive lobbying efforts on behalf of
industry, trade associations, and patient advocacy groups. Ultimately some common ground was reached among different segments of industry and stakeholders
404
advising the development of later legislation. Early legislation tended to skew
405
toward the efforts of brand-name industry. For example, the North Dakota law
4 06
the Massacontains specific language formulated by Amgen and Genentech;
chusetts law, passed in June 2014, was promoted by both BIO and the Massa407
and reporting by the California's Secretary
chusetts Biotechnology Council;

of State note that lobbying entities included AbbVie, Amgen, BIO, Genentech,
and PhRMA. 408 Some sources report that the FDA, among others, was initially
very concerned about these state efforts with one spokesperson stating that the
409
Concerns over
state laws were "efforts to undermine trust in these products."
widespread confusion among legislators about biosimilars were feeding misun4 10
derstanding and misperceptions.
The self-interested drivers of the legislation aside, in comparison to well-established generic substitution laws, the interchangeable biologic substitution
laws are lacking in specificity, are untested in application, and are variable
across jurisdictions in troubling ways for patients given the nature of biologic
products. These aspects were discussed in Part

III.A. Coupled with the FDA and

FTC scrutiny over potential antitrust behaviors in the biologic realm, the time is
ripe for a reassessment of the purpose and function of these state laws. One avenue to accomplish this is through a Model State Law committee and process
that reviews the laws and compares to generic substitution laws in a rigorous

40

4 Robert

Weissman & Hannah Brennan, Competition Inhibitors:How Biologics Makers
are Leveraging Politicalpower to Maintain Monopolies and Keep PricesSky High, PUBLIC
CITIZEN 26-28 (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/report-biologicsindustry-leverages-political-power-to-maintain-monopolies-and-inflate-prices.pdf

[https://perma.cc/7WJT-DE5Q].
405 Paradise, supra note 115, at 79.
406 Dan Stanton, Cali Gov Vetoes Biosimilar Bill, Thwarting Amgen and Genentech,
https://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Arti2013),
16,
(Oct.
REP.
BIOPHARMA

cle/2013/10/16/Biosimilars-restricting-bi11-vetoed-by-California-Governor
[https://perma.cc/Y27L-6R9D].
407 Adrianne Appel, Massachusetts Governor Signs BiosimilarsBill with Patient Notification, 12 PHARM. L. & INDUSTRY REP. (BNA) 916, 916 (2014).
408 Weissman & Brennan, supra note 404, at 27. See also Sandburg, supra note 183, at 20.
409
Alaric DeArment, Reports: FDA Says Carve-outBills 'Undermine Trust'in Biosimilars,
DRUG STORE NEWS (Aug. 29, 2013), https://drugstorenews.com/news/reports-fda-says-Carveout-bills-undermine-trust-biosimilars [https://perma.cc/LR9M-TWKL].
4 10
See Sandburg, supranote 183, at 20.
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and meaningful way without conflicts of interest at play. The National Consumer
Law Center may be ideally situated to lead this effort at initial stages.
C. Cap Prices at the FederalLevel

Many states are taking aggressive action with laws that set caps on insulin
costs through a variety of methods 41 However, this legislation likewise suffers
from jurisdictional inconsistency and will ultimately lead to inconsistent inter-

pretation in the courts. The Minnesota legal challenge is one example of how
this may play out in the court system as more states pass legislation. 412 Patients

in one state with such a law, like Colorado, will have a much different cost profile for their insulins (whether the innovator biologic or an interchangeable product) than a patient without such a law. Variation in the actualization of the "cap"
will also be an issue, where some states cap the total across all necessary insulin
costs per month, including combinations of products and supporting devices,
and others cap per prescription, which may add up to hundreds of dollars for
multiple products on a monthly basis.413
Given that insulin is a life-saving treatment for a tremendous proportion of
the U.S, and global, population, it seems an appropriate and equitable public
health action to cap insulin costs at the federal level. Mechanisms to accomplish
this rely chiefly on Congress; prior bills seeking to establish federal caps on
pricing through various means have failed. 414 There may be a role for building
in pricing caps into the efforts to harmonize state laws through model legislation
as well.
D. Provide Clarity and Parityon Preemption

The complicated matrix of federal preemption case law speaks for itself
across the FDA-regulated product areas. In the past, both Congress and the FDA
have attempted to revise the CBE-0 requirements to also apply to generic
drugs. 415 Both of those efforts have resulted in no change to the stark difference

411 See Amy Martyn, States are Trying to Cap the Price of Insulin. Pharmaceutical
Com-

panies are PushingBack, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/states-are-trying-cap-price-insulin-pharmaceutical-companies-are-pushing-n 1236766

[https://perma.cc/YH25-ZEZU].
41 See PharmaceuticalIndustry Sues to Block MinnesotaInsulin Law, MoD. HEALTHCARE
(Jul. 1, 2020), https://www.modemhealthcare.com/legal/pharmaceutical-industry-suesblock-minnesota-insulin-law [https://perma.cc/59TK-7LLF].
4 13
See discussion supra Part 1.B.
4 14
See Peter Sullivan, Chancesfor Drug Pricing, Surprise Billing Action Fade until No-

vember, THE HILL (Mar. 24, 2020), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/489334-chances-fordrug-pricing-surprise-billing-action-fade-until-november [https://perma.cc/A6TC-GZ4P].
41

" See Amrita Singh, Nicole M. Maisch & Maha Saad, Update on Generic-DrugLabeling
Requirements, U.S. PHARMACIST (June 23, 2015), https://www.uspharmacist.com/article/up-

date-on-generic-drug-labeling-requirements [https://perma.cc/Y6KG-JRSC]; Withdrawal of
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in outcome on preemption for new drugs approved through the NDA process
and generic drugs requiring "sameness" to the NDA drug, including all labeling.
These initiatives could be revived to provide parity in this realm and confer an
affirmative obligation on the drug manufacturer to enhance warnings when appropriate.
The regulation, as currently written, applies only to drugs. Amending it to

sync outcomes for drugs would not solve the problem for biologics. However,
the FDA has a separate regulation pertaining to changes to a biologic label, as

discussed in Part IV.C. That regulation, 21 C.F.R. §601.12, establishes requirements similar to the CBE-0 drug regulation by allowing addition of heightening

4 16
In addition, FDA
warnings on the label without prior approval by the FDA.

guidance seems to require that both biologic innovators and any biosimilar or
interchangeable products are held to the same standard to change the product
417
labeling in the face of risk information. If this reading is accurate, no conflict
or obstacle preemption would apply regarding changes to the label to enhance
safety warnings of biosimilar or interchangeable products. But this reading is
subject to interpretation and has not been subject to judicial scrutiny through a
state tort liability lens. Congress, or the FDA, could address this issue through

legislation, or rulemaking. However, there is a final issue of FDA authority to
act through guidance document with the binding effect of law, which is discussed in E, below.
E. Examine the FDA'sAuthority to Act by Guidance Document

Finally, an exploration of the FDA's use of guidance documents in the biosimilar and interchangeable biologic arena to issue policy with legally binding
impact is warranted. While Congress clearly instructs the agency within the

BPCIA to act through guidance along with public comment, it remains to be
seen whether that process is appropriate in developing product review and ap-

proval requirements to implement the statute. Perhaps more importantly from a
judicial perspective, it is unclear whether FDA guidance documents regarding
biosimilars and interchangeable biologics, will be subject to judicial deference
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., Skidmore, or

otherwise. This includes guidance that sets forth general evidentiary requirements and considerations, and those specifically that address changes to a product label as discussed above.

Proposed Rule on Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs and Biological Products, 83 Fed. Reg. 64,223, 64,299 (Dec. 14, 2018).
416 21 C.F.R. § 601.12(f)(2)(A) (2019).
417 FDA, LABELING FOR BIOSIMILAR PRODUCTS (2018) at 9-10, https://www.fda.gov/media/96894/download [https://perma.cc/NA8F-NQNV]. Again, the statute requires biosimilars
to be "highly similar" to the innovator biologic, rather than bioequivalent, and the statute does
not require the label to be "the same as" or identical to the innovator, as generic drugs must
be in order to enter the market.

2021 ]

INSULIN FEDERALISM

177

The Supreme Court has not opined on the deference question with respect to
FDA guidance documents. There is a 1986 Supreme Court Case, Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, where the Court gave Chevron deference to an FDA

"action level", a threshold numerical limit on the presence of a contaminant in
food without rendering it adulterated under the statute.4 18 The action level did
not go through notice and comment rulemaking but was published in the Federal
Register. 4 19 The court applied the two prong inquiry identified in Chevron two

years prior - that where a statute that the agency administers is silent or ambiguous with regard to a particular issue, the courts should defer to an agency's
reasonable interpretation of that statute.4 20 The case involved a regulation defining and applying the bubble concept to measuring and capping industrial emissions. 42 1 In 1997, FDA made guidance documents non-binding on the agency

through notice and comment rulemaking, which was codified by Congress that
same year and required FDA to develop good guidance practices, which the

FDA subsequently did through notice and comment rulemaking. 422 Among other
things contained in the good guidance practices, the guidance document must
state that the guidance "does not legally bind the public or FDA." 423
Christensen v. HarrisCounty then reinvigorated the concept of "lesser" Skidmore deference in 2000, looking at an agency's "power to persuade" through

means other than rulemaking.4 24 One year later, the Supreme Court held in U.S.
v. Mead Corp. that where an agency operates through interpretation that is not
derived from statutory authority in particular, deference will depend on "the
agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency's position." 425 Notably, Wyeth v. Levine tangentially

involved an issue of deference, where the Court did not give any level of deference to an FDA statement in the preamble to a regulation. 426 But there it was a
change to long-standing FDA policy without notice and comment rulemaking

and this was a preemption case ultimately scrutinizing Congressional intent. The
lower courts are inconsistent in applying deference to different types of FDA

Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 977, 980 (1986).
1d. at 978.
420 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
42 1
1d. at 837, 862, 866.
42221 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2019); The Food and Drug Administration's Development, Issuance, and Use of Guidance Documents, 62 Fed. Reg. 8867, 8961 (Feb. 27, 1997).
423 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (2019).
424 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). Skidmore v. Swift
& Co. ruled
418

41 9

that an administrative agency's interpretive rules were to be given deference according to

their "power to persuade." The case precedes the 1984 Chevron decision. 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944).
425 U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).
426 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577
(2009).
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actions, and the FDA will sometimes concede that certain informal policy is sub4 27
ject to the lesser Skidmore deference.
Although the FDA has followed Congressional directive by acting through
guidance document plus public notice and comment, challenges will arise as to
the legal effect of guidance documents pertaining to biosimilars and interchangeable products. Where Congress approves of FDA's actions already taken, they
may confirm the legality through legislation. It is extremely likely given the mo-

mentum to bring an interchangeable insulin product to market that the FDA's
policy effectuated through guidance document will be tested in the context of an
insulin product.
CONCLUSION

The FDA and the biopharmaceutical industry have signaled through various

means that interchangeable insulins are on the horizon. Once an interchangeable
product is approved by the FDA, a cascade of legal questions will follow regarding the scope of the statute introducing the abbreviated routes to market for biologic products, agency actions in issuing guidance documents to implement the
statute, state legislation governing product substitution and insulin price caps,
and the complex judicial landscape for federal preemption of state tort liability.
There is room to move across all these fronts proactively to anticipate problems

and alter the legal frameworks at both the federal and state level. This article
identifies the scope of these challenges and offers five modest suggestions to
address them prior to the realization of interchangeable insulin.
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See, e.g., Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 2008).

